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1A THEORY OF GOVERNMENT DAMAGES LIABILITY: 
TORTS, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS, AND TAKINGS 
 
Lawrence Rosenthal* 
Confusion reigns when it comes to government liability in tort.  Governmental tort liability 
is riddled with immunities unknown in the private sector – a confusing patchwork without seeming 
explanation.1 Government tort liability is also without a justificatory theory.  Theories of tort 
liability generally fall within two broad camps:  the instrumentalists claim that tort liability promotes 
efficient investments in safety by cutting into the revenues of those who under-invest in safety; and 
the advocates of corrective justice claim that tort liability embodies a moral obligation of culpable 
parties to bear losses for which they are fairly considered responsible.2 Neither theory offers much 
support for government tort liability.  Unlike private tortfeasors, the government’s objective is not 
profit maximization; it responds to political and not market discipline.  Thus, the instrumental 
justification for tort liability is wanting in the public sector.3 As for corrective justice, the 
government passes its legal costs along to the taxpayers, who bear little meaningful culpability for 
the underlying tortious conduct but who may be taxed to fund essentially unlimited liability far in 
excess of the exposure to liability faced, for example, by a shareholder in a private corporation.  
Thus, corrective justice also supplies little support for public-sector tort liability.4 Indeed, there is an 
emerging consensus among legal scholars that government tort liability lacks a coherent 
justification.5 Unease with government liability is not confined to the academy; the United States 
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1 See text at notes 20-56, infra.
2 For explication of this bifurcated characterization of tort theory, see, e.g., Christopher J. Robinette, Can There 
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2Supreme Court has itself expressed doubts about the utility of damages awards against the 
government. 6 
In the discussion that follows, I mean to show that the emerging consensus is wrong. To do 
so, I anchor the justification for government tort liability in a theory of political behavior.  I look to 
politics because the government responds primarily to political costs and benefits, whereas private 
tortfeasors respond primarily to economic rewards or punishment.   I argue that government tort 
liability exacts a political price by diverting the funds used to pay judgments and other litigation 
costs from what elected officials regard as their politically optimal use.  Government liability 
therefore creates a political incentive to invest in loss prevention in order to maximize political 
control over tax and spending policy.  This theory, however, does not argue for unlimited 
government liability; to the contrary, it provides a justification for many of the immunities from 
government liability. 
The discussion below proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the scope of government 
damages liability.  Part II the demonstrates the inability of conventional theories of tort law to 
support government liability, and goes on to defend government tort liability by arguing that it 
creates a political incentive to make cost-justified investments in safety not present in a regime of 
non-liability.  Part II submits that there is considerable empirical evidence to support the theory of 
political behavior that it advances – the consistent legislative practice of enacting governmental tort 
immunity statutes.   
While Parts I and II are descriptive, Part III is evaluative.  It argues that the case for 
government common law tort liability is weak because there are important political incentives to 
invest in loss-prevention apart from the threat of tort liability.  Moreover, tort actions against the 
government require juries to assess the manner in which scarce public resources are allocated among 
competing priorities, something they have little ability to do.  And, forcing government to divert 
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3scarce resources to the defense of litigation and the payment of judgments has important adverse 
impacts on essentially innocent third parties – the taxpayers and those dependent upon the ability of 
government to adequately fund public services.   Part III therefore argues government tort liability is 
unwarranted when it is reasonable to believe that ordinary political accountability will adequately 
encourage governmental investments in safety.   Statutory immunity for discretionary functions is a 
good example of the point – it confers immunity in cases when political accountability will likely 
provide sufficient protection for the public without need of a damages remedy.   Limitations on 
recoverable damages – such as ceilings on damages awards and a prohibition on punitive damages – 
are warranted as a means of mitigating the adverse effects of government liability.  
When it comes to constitutional torts, however, Part III takes a different view.  The 
Constitution does not leave its enforcement to the political process; accordingly, political 
accountability is never an adequate remedy for a constitutional violation.  Discretionary and other 
categorical immunities are therefore inappropriate for constitutional violations; a law of 
constitutional torts should place pressure on the government to conform all of its conduct to the 
Constitution.  That does not mean, however, that every constitutional violation must result in a 
damages award.  The doctrine of qualified immunity properly limits liability when the government 
has committed adequate resources to avoiding constitutional violations.  Statutory limitations on 
recoverable damages and the requirement that only traditional tort damages be awarded are also 
justifiable as a means of mitigating the risk that large damages liabilities will compromise the 
government’s ability to provide public services.  But for one type of constitutional liability rule – the 
obligation to pay just compensation when government takes private property for a public purpose – 
immunity is never appropriate.  The compensation requirement creates a political check against 
unwarranted takings; there is a political cost when public resources must be allocated to the payment 
of compensation.  Still, the political costs imposed by the just compensation requirement are 
particularly high, and for that the Supreme Court has been correct to defer to the political process 
4on the question of what kinds of takings are for a public use, as in the Court’s recent decision in Kelo 
v. City of New London.7
I THE CONTOURS OF GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY 
The rules for government tort liability are complex.  One set of rules governs suits against a 
governmental defendant, and another when the suit is against a public employee.  Liability rules 
differ for federal, state, and local governments, and for constitutional and nonconstitutional torts.  
One type of constitutional injury – a “taking” of private property for public use – receives different 
treatment altogether. 8 
A.  Common Law Torts 
The history of government liability in tort reflects an evolution from a common law doctrine 
of sovereign immunity to a seemingly unprincipled patchwork of statutory immunity. 
 1.  Federal tort liability – Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal 
government is immune from liability for damages without its consent.9 Under this common law 
rule, however, federal employees were personally liable for their own wrongful conduct even when 
acting within the scope of employment.10 
It is sometimes said that the sovereign immunity of the United States is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.11 To be sure, Article III provides that “[t]he judicial power shall extend . . . to 
 
7 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
8 Government liability for breach of contract involves considerations beyond the scope of this article.  For a 
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9 See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).   For 
early statements of the doctrine, which contain little in the way of a supporting rationale, see United States v. Clarke, 33 
U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). 
10 See, e.g., Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency 
Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567 (1922).  This rule is not applicable, however, when the relief sought went beyond the 
payment of damages by the individual defendant and involved remedial measures thought to implicate the interests of 
the sovereign.  See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).  For discussion of the 
scope of federal sovereign immunity, see, e,g, David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 
SUP. CT. REV. 149; David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1
(1972); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV 521 (2003); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1987).  
11 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 10, at 523; Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. 
5Controversies to which the United States shall be a party,”12 and the Constitution breathes not a 
word about a federal immunity from liability.  The view that sovereign immunity has no 
constitutional grounding, however, overlooks the Appropriations Clause.  It provides:  “No money 
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”13 
Most state constitutions contain similar restrictions.14 Under such a constitutional restriction on the 
use of public funds, a court cannot hear a case asking it to compel the government to pay a 
judgment absent legislative authorization for payment; in such a case, the remedy sought is itself 
unconstitutional.   
For example, in District of Columbia v. Eslin,15 while the cases at issue were on appeal, 
Congress forbade payment of the judgments that the plaintiffs had obtained, and the Supreme Court 
concluded that no court could enforce the judgments, rendering the cases nonjusticiable.16 More 
 
REV. 1, 38-46, 65-66 (2002). 
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  The scholarship of which I am aware to support federal sovereign immunity in the 
Constitution’s text is Professor Nelson’ claim that the term “controversy” was understood at the time of Article III’s 
adoption to exclude a suit against a sovereign without its consent.  Professor Nelson assembles considerable evidence for 
his claim that in the eighteenth century, a court could not exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign without its consent, but 
much less evidence to support his claim that such a suit was not considered a “controversy.”  See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign 
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1567-608 (2002).  And the historical evidence on the 
ability to sue sovereign without its consent immunity is highly contestable.  See, e.g., John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-914 (1983).  
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  For the leading account of the Appropriations Clause, see Kate Stith, Congress’ 
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988). 
14 Forty states have parallel constitutional provisions.  See ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 72; ALASKA CONST. art. 9, § 13; 
ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 29; CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 7; DEL CONST. art. 8, § 6(a); FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; GA. CONST. art. 
3, § 9; HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 10, § 3; 
IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 24; KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 24; KY. CONST. § 230; LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(A); ME. CONST. art. 5, 
pt. 3, § 4; MD. CONST. art. 3, § 32; MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 1; MO. CONST. art. 3, § 36; MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 14; 
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 25; NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 19; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 7; N.C. CONST.
art. 5, § 7; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 30; N.D. CONST. art. X, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 22; OKL. CONST. art. V, § 55; 
ORE. CONST. art. IX, § 4; PA. CONST. art. 3, § 24; S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 8; S.D. CONST. art. XI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. 
II, § 24; TEX CONST. art. 8, § 6; VA. CONST. art. X, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; W. VA. CONST. art. 10, § 3; WIS.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 35.  In addition, three state constitutions expressly provide for sovereign 
immunity, see ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35; and twenty-two grant the 
state legislature authority to determine governmental liability.  See ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21; CONN. CONST. art. XI, § 
4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13; GA. CONST. art. I, § II, ¶ 9(a); ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; IND.
CONST. art. 4, § 24; KY. CONST. § 231; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(c); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 18; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 
22; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 22; N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 19; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. 23, § 7; OR.
CONST. art. IV, § 24; Pa. CONST. art. 1, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 27; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 17; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 
26; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 27; WYO.CONST. art. I, § 8. 
15 183 U.S. 62 (1901).  
16 See id. at 65-66. 
6recently, in OPM v. Richmond,17 the Court held that a claimant could not use common law estoppel 
principles to obtain federal disability benefits not authorized by statute because a court-ordered 
payment of benefits without congressional authorization would violate the Appropriations Clause.18 
Thus, the Appropriations Clause and its state counterparts effectively insulate the government from 
suit for damages absent legislative authorization.19 An appropriations-based understanding of 
sovereign immunity also explains why sovereign immunity poses no obstacle to a suit against a 
public employee even when he acts at the direction of the sovereign.  Under the Appropriations 
Clause, the United States cannot satisfy a damages judgment absent legislative consent, but there is 
no obstacle to enforcing a damages award against a federal official’s own assets. 
Despite the availability of sovereign immunity, Congress has been unwilling to shield the 
federal treasury from all tort liability.   The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides:  “The 
United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive 
damages.”20 The FTCA adds that it supplies the exclusive remedy for torts committed by a federal 
employee acting within the scope of employment except for an action brought under the United 
 
17 496 U.S. 414 (1990). 
18 See id. at 424-26. 
19 To be sure, appropriations legislation may itself be challenged under a substantive constitutional provision.  
See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (1997) (First Amendment); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 
(1946) (Bill of Attainder Clause).   Moreover, under the decision in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), 
appropriations legislation is thought to impermissibly infringe upon the judicial power under Article III when it directs 
the judiciary to apply a rule of decision without altering substantive law.  See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347-49 
(2000); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 438-41 (1992).  But Klein does not invalidate legislation that 
merely declines to fund the judgment sought by the plaintiff, as the holding in Eslin demonstrates.  Eslin, in turn, is 
consistent with contemporary Article III jurisprudence.   Article III is understood to prevent a court from hearing a case 
when the plaintiff’s injury cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.  See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).  Thus, when there 
is no appropriation available to pay the damages award sought by the plaintiff, a court would be unable to hear that case 
under Article III because it could not issue an enforceable damages award in light of the Appropriations Clause.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court held that the Court of Claims could issue judgments against the United States without running afoul 
of Article III only by relying on Congress’s consistent practice of appropriating funds to pay judgments of that court.  See 
Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 520 (1962).  
20 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000).   
7States Constitution or a federal statute.21 The FTCA grants immunity from liability on  
 [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising 
due care, in the execution or enforcement of a statute or regulation, whether or not such 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.22 
The FTCA also confers immunity from liability for “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, 
or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,”23 a “claim arising in respect of the assessment 
or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other 
property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer,”24 and “[a]ny 
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights . . . .”25 
2.  State and local tort liability – Only one state has enacted legislation providing that 
governmental defendants are liable in tort on the same terms as private tortfeasors.26 All other 
states limit government tort liability by statute. Many state immunity statutes confer immunities on 
governmental defendants and public employees similar to those in the FTCA; for example, 33 states 
recognize discretionary function immunity;27 23 recognize immunity for injuries caused by reliance 
 
21 See id. § 2679(b).  
22 Id. § 2680(a).   
23 Id. § 2680(b).  
24 Id. § 2680(c). 
25 Id. § 2680(c).  Immunity is additionally conferred from liability for the fiscal operations of the Treasury or 
the regulation of the monetary system, see id. § 2680(h), claims arising out of the combatant activities of the military, see id. 
 § 2680(i), claims arising in a foreign country, see id. § 2680(k), and claims arising from the activities of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the Panama Canal Company, or from the activities of federal banks, see id. § 2680(l)-(n). 
26 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.92.090 & 4.96.010  (2005).  There is, however, a Washington statute granting 
public officials immunity for discretionary acts or omissions but it provides that their employer remains liable.  See id. § 
4.24.470.  Even so, the Washington Supreme Court has construed the statute to preserve common law government 
immunity for discretionary functions.  See McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman , 882 P.2d 157, 161-63 (Wash. 1994).  For a 
discussion of the experience of Washington, see Michael Tardif, Washington State’s 45-Year Experiment in Governmental 
Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
27 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (2005) (state and state employees); id. § 09.65.070(d)(2) (local governments 
and employees); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820.01 (2004); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.2 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
557n(a)(2)(B) (2004) (local governments and employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001(1)& 4011(b)(3) (2005); GA.
STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(2) (2005) (state and state employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15(1) (2005) (state and state 
employees); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/2-201 (2004) (local governments and 
employees); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(7) (2005); IOWA CODE §§ 669.14(1) & 670.4(3) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
6104(e) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.073.13(a) & 65.2003(3)(d) (2005) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2798.1(B) (2005); 
8on statutes or other enactments;28 23 immunize the collection of a tax;29 17 states immunize 
specified intentional torts of public employees;30 and 40 states confer immunity from punitive 
damages.31 Other common immunities conferred on state and local governments and their 
 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8104B(3) & 8111(1)(C) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-507(b)(1) 
(2006) (municipal employees absent malice); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(b) (2005); MINN STAT. §§ 3.736(3)(b) & 
466.03(6) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(d) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13.910(2) & 81-8,219(1) (2005) (state 
and its employees); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.032(2) (Michie 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-03(3)(d) & 32-12.2-
02(3)(b) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. § 541-B:19 (2005) (state and state employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(a), (c)-(d) 
(West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.03(A)(2) & (5) (West 2005) (local governments and employees); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 155 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(3)(c) (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8524(3) & 8546(3) (West 
2005) (state employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (Law Co-op 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(1) (2005) 
(local governments); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056 (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-
301(5)(a) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601(e)(1) (2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(4) (West 2005) (construed to 
confer discretionary immunity in Kiersyn v. Racine Unified School Dist., 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999)).  Other jurisdictions 
recognize discretionary immunity as a common law doctrine.   See Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1126 
(D.C. 1992); Weiss v. Fote, 167 N.E.2d 63, 65-68 (N.Y. 1984); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420 (Va. 
2004); Libercent v. Aldrich, 539 A.2d 981, 984 (Vt. 1987); McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, 882 P.2d 157, 161-63 
(Wash. 1994); Parkulo v. West Va. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996). 
28 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.6 (West 2004); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(1) (2005) (state and state 
employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15(1) (2004) (state and state employees); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (2005); 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 2-203 (2004) (local governments and employees); IOWA CODE §§ 669.14(1) & 670.4(3) (2004); IND.
CODE § 34-13-3-3(9) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(c) (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(a) (2005); MINN 
STAT. §§ 3.736(3)(a) 466.03(5) & 466.03(5) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(b) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-
103 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-910(1) & 81-8,219(1) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.032(1) (Michie 2005); N.H. 
REV. STAT. § 541-B:19 (2005) (state and state employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-4 (West 2005) (public employees); 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-03(3)(a) & 32-12.2-02(3)(a) (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(4) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.265(3)(f) (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8524(2) (West 2005) (state employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(4) 
(Law. Co-op. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601(e)(1) (2005) (state); W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(4) (2005) (local 
governments).  
29 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-204(b)(2)(B) (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 860.2 (West 2004); GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 50-21-24(3) (2005) (state and state employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15(2) (2005) (state and state employees); IDAHO 
CODE § 6-904(A)(1) (2005); IOWA CODE §§ 669.14(2) & 670.4(2)  (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(f) (2005); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2003(2) (2004) (municipalities and employees); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(d) (2005); MINN 
STAT. §§ 3.736(3)(c) & 466.03(3)  (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(i) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-219(5) & 81-
219(2) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-02(3)(h)(2005) (state and employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:7-2 (West 2005); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(11) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(3)(b) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(11) (Law. Co-
op. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(8) (2005) (local governments); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
101.055(1) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(h) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(8) (2005) (local 
governments); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3(5) (Michie 2005) (state); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601(e)(2) (2005) (state).  
See also S.S. Kresge Co. v. Bouchard, 306 A.2d 179 (R.I. 1973) (construing statutory waiver of sovereign immunity not to 
reach action alleging unlawful overassessment of taxes). 
30 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(3) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n(a)(2)(A) (2004) (local governments); 
GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(7) (2005) (state); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15(4) (2005) (state); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(3) 
(2005); IOWA CODE § 669.14(4) (2004) (state); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.072 (2005) (states and counties); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(4) (2006) (state immune for employee’s malice or gross negligence); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258, § 10(c) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,219(4) & 13-910(7) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-10 (West 
2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-01(6) (2005) (state); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.03(A)(2) (West 2005) (local 
governments);  TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-307(d) &  29-20-205(2) (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
101.057(2) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(b) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601(e)(6) (2005) 
(state). 
31 See ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 (2005) (state and local governments); ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (2006) (state); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820-04 (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 818 (West 2004) (state and local governments); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-10-114(4) (2005) (state and local governments); FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2005); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-30 
9employees include immunity for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, or revocation of a license,32 
a failure to inspect or to make an adequate inspection of property,33 the adoption or failure to adopt 
 
(2005) (state and state employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15 (2004) (state government); IDAHO CODE § 6-918 (2005); 
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/2-102 (2004) (local governments); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-4(b) (2005); IOWA CODE §§. 669.4 
& 670.4(5) 2004) (state and local governments); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105(c) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2002 
(2005) (municipalities and employees ); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 5-522(a)(1) & 5-303(c)(1) (2006) (state 
and local governments); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8105(5) (2005) (state and local governments); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 258, § 2 (2005); MINN STAT. §§ 3.736(3) & 466.04(1)(b) (2005) (state and local governments); MONT. CODE ANN. §
2-9-105 (2005) (state and local governments); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15(2) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.610(3) 
(2006) (state and local governments); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.035(1) (2005) (state and local governments); N.H. 
REV. STAT. §§ 541-B:14(I) & 507-B:3(II) (2005) (state and state employees); N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-4-19(C) (2005); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(c) (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-03(2) & 32-12.2-02(2) (2005) (state and local 
governments); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.05(A) (West 2005) (local governments); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(C) 
(2005) (state and local governments); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270(2) (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8528(c) & 8553(c) 
(West 2005) (local governments);  S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-190(b) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(d) (2005) 
(state); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.024 (Vernon 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie 2005); W 
VA. CODE § 29-12A-7(a) (2005) (local governments and employees); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3) (West 2005); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-39-118(d) (2005).  See also Hazen v. City of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 465-66 (Alaska 1986) (local 
governments); Prigge v. Conn. Dep’t of Child & Families, No. X06CV02181467, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 804 at *13 
(Conn. Super. Ct. March 26, 2004) (state); City of Hartford v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 717 A.2d 258 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1998) (local governments); Schueler v. Martin, 674 A.2d 882 (Del. Super. 1996) (state and local governments); Graff v. 
Motta, 695 A.2d 486 (R.I. 1997) (state and local governments). 
32 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(3) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820-.02(A)(5) (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 818.4 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n(a)(2)(b)(7) (2004) (local governments and employees); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 10, § 4011(b)(2) (2005) (local governments and local employees); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(9) (2005) (state 
and state employees); IDAHO CODE § 6-904B(3) (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/2-104 (2004) (local governments 
and employees); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(11) (2005); IOWA CODE § 670.4(9)-(10) (2004) (local governments and 
employees); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2003(3)(c) (2005) (municipalities and employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 
8104B(2) (2005) (state and local governments);  id. § 8111(1)(B) (public employees); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(e) 
(2005); MINN STAT. §§ 3.736(3)(k) & 466.03(15) (2005) (state and state employees and municipalities); id. § 466.03(6d), 
(10) (local employees immune except for day care licensing); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(h) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 81-8,219(8) (2005) (state and state employees); id. § 13-910(4) (local governments and employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:2-5 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-03(3)(f) & 32-12.2-02(3)(d) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2743.01(A) & (E) (West 2005) (state and state employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(13) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
78-60(12) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-307(a)(2)(B) &  29-20-205(3) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(c) 
(2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(9) (2005) (local governments).  See also Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm’n, 553 F. Supp. 752, 765 n.9 (D.R.I. 1982) (construing Rhode Island’s 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity not to reach licensing cases). 
33 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(1) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820-.02(A)(6) (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 818.6 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4011(b)(1) (2005); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(8) (2005) (state and state 
employees); IDAHO CODE § 6-904B(4) (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/2-105 (2004) (local governments and 
employees); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(12) (2005); IOWA CODE § 669.14(13) (2004) (state and state employees) (inspection 
of pools or spas); id. § 670.4(6), (12) (local governments and employees immune for latent defects relating to inspection 
of pools or spas); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(k) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2003(e) (2005) (municipalities and 
employees); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(f) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219(7) (2005) (state and state employees); 
id. § 13-910(3) (local governments and employees); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.033 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-6 
(West 2005); N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 205-d (McKinney 2005) (New York City fire wardens); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
12.1-02(3)(f) (2005) (local governments and employees); id. § 32-12.2-02(3)(f) (state and state employees); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2743.01(A) & (E) (West 2005) (state and state employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 155 (2005); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 15-78-60(13) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-307(a)(2)(A) &  29-20-205(4) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
30d-301(5)(d) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(10) (2005) (local governments); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(1p) (West 
2005).  
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legislation or other legislative functions,34 acts or omissions in the execution or enforcement of the 
law,35 the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings,36 the plan or design for public 
improvements,37 the condition of property or facilities used for recreational purposes,38 the 
 
34 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 818.2 (West 2004); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(4) (2005) (state and state 
employees);  745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/2-103 (2004) (local governments and employees); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(8) 
(2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(a) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2003(3)(a) (2005) (municipalities and 
employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104B(1) (2005) (state and local governments); id. § 8111(1)(A) (public 
employees); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(a), (e) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-111(2) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:2-3(b) (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-03(3)(b) & 32-12.2-02(3)(c)  (2005); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2744.03(A)(1) (West 2005) (local governments and employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(1) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-78-60(1)-(2), (4) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3(2) (Michie 2005) (state); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(4) (2005) 
(local governments). 
35 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 821.4 (West 2004) (immunity from negligence except for false arrest and 
imprisonment); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n(a)(2)(b)(8) (2004) (municipal immunity absent notice of illegality or 
reckless disregard for health or safety); id. § 52-57n(a)(2)(b)(9) (municipal immunity for failure to detect or prevent 
pollution); IDAHO CODE § 6-904B(1) (2005) (detention of goods by a law enforcement officer); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
10/2-202 (2004) (immunity from negligence for local governments and employees); IOWA CODE § 669.14(3), (11) (2004) 
(state and state employees immune for detention of goods or merchandise by a law enforcement officer or an act or 
omission in financial regulation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(c) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.073(13)(d) (2005) 
(state immunity from liabilities for duties running to the public as a whole); id. § 65.2003(3)(b) (municipalities and 
employees immune for failure to enforce any law); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(j) (2005) (detention by law 
enforcement absent malice or arbitrary and capricious conduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-4 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
51, § 155(4) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(4) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(4) (2005) (local governments).  
See also Dang v. Ehredt, 977 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (law enforcement officers enjoy common law 
immunity for reasonable enforcement decisions). 
36 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.26 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-57n(a)(2)(b)(5) (2004) (local 
governments and employees); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(5) (2005) (state and state employees); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
10/2-208 (2004) (local governments and employees); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(6) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 
8104B(4) & 8111(1)(D) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(b) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.03(A)(1) (West 
2005) (local governments and employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(2) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(23) (2005); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(5) (2005) (local governments); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) (2005); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-195.3(6) (Michie 2005) (state); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(2) (2005) (local governments).  
37 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 830.6 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(7) (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/3-
103 (2004) (local governments); IOWA CODE §§ 669.14(8) & 670.4(7)-(8)  (2004) (immunity for highways, roads or streets 
absent gross negligence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(m) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104A(2)(A) & (4) 
(2005) (state and local governments immune for the construction, ownership, or maintenance of historic sites and dams 
or defects, lack of repair, or lack of railing on highway, sidewalk, parking area, sidewalk, bridge, or airport runway); 
MINN. STAT. § 466.03(18) (2005) (schools immune for fire code variances sought for security reasons); id. § 466.03(20) 
(local governments and employees immune for condition, use or maintenance of land acquired for highway projects); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(p) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-910(11) & 81-8,219(11) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:4-6 (West 2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.063 & 101.064(b) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §
63-30d-301(5)(n) (2005) (flood or storm systems); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601(e)(8) (2005) (state highways); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-39-120 (2005) (design defects in bridges, culverts, highways, roadways, streets, alleys, sidewalks or 
parking areas, as well as failure to construct or reconstruct or failure to maintain same). 
38 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 831.21 (West 2004) (beaches); id. § 831.4 (trails providing access to recreational 
areas); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n(a)(2)(b)(4) (2004) (local governments); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15(7) (2005) (state 
and state employees immune for acts of a boating enforcement officer); id. § 662-19 (immunity for injury from use of a 
public skateboard park); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/3-106 (2004) (immunity from negligence for local governments); 
IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(4) (2005) (unpaved roads, trails of footpaths that provide access to recreational or scenic areas); 
id. § 34-13-3-3(5) (extreme sports areas); IOWA CODE § 670.4(15) (2005) (local governments and employees immune on 
claims arising from skateboarding, in-line skating, bicycling, unicycling, scootering, river rafting, canoeing, or kayaking); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(o) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104A(2)(A) (2005) (state and local governments); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 3.736(3)(i) & 466.03(15) (2005) (state and state employees and local governments for parks, areas, and 
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condition of unimproved public property,39 a failure to provide adequate police service or 
protection,40 a failure to provide adequate jails or other corrections or penal facilities,41 injuries 
caused by the probation, parole, release, or escape of arrestees, convicts, or prisoners,42 a failure to 
provide adequate firefighting or other emergency service,43 a failure to prevent disease or to impose 
a quarantine or an injury caused by a quarantine or incurred in the course of a public health 
 
trails); id. § 466.03(6e)-(6(f) (local employees immune for parks and waterslides); N.H. REV. STAT. § 507-B:11 (2005) 
(municipalities and school districts immune for property used without charge for skateboarding, rollerblading, 
stuntbiking or rollerskiing); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-7 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(16), (26) (2005).  
39 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n(a)(2)(b)(1) (2004); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(1) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
75-6104(p) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104A(2)(A) (2005) (state and local governments); MINN STAT. §§ 
3.736(3)(g) & 466.03(15) (2005) (state and local governments); id. § 466.03(13) (local employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-
8 & 4-9 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-02(3)(k) (2005) (state and state employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 
155(9)-(10) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(10) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(k) (2005); W. VA. CODE 
§ 29-12A-5(a)(7) (2005) (local governments).  
40 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820-.02(A)(1) (2006) (immunity from negligence); id. § 12-820-.02(A)(7)-(8) 
(immunity from negligence for failure to prevent unlawful sales of handguns or for preventing the sale of a handgun); 
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 845 & 846 (West 2004); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-24(6) (2005) (state and state employees);  745 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/4-102 & 4-107 (2004) (local governments and employees); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(n) 
(2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.073(13)(e) (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(h) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-
46-9(1)(c) (2005) (absent reckless disregard for the safety of a person not engaged in criminal activity); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:5-4 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-03(3)(f) & 32-12.2-02(3)(f) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2743.02(A)(3)(a) (West 2005) (state and state employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.055(3) (Vernon 2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(5) (2005) (local governments); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
893.80(6) (West 2005) (major cities). 
41 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820-.02(A)(4) (2006) (immunity from negligence for injury to one prisoner caused 
by another); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.2 (West 2004); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/4-103 (2004) (local governments and 
employees); IOWA CODE § 669.14(6) (2004) (state and state employees immune on any claim by an inmate); MINN STAT.
§§ 3.736(3)(m) & 466.03(12) (2004) (destruction of property of state prisoners or residents of institutions); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(d) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(m) (2005) (immunity from claims of prisoners); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 2-9-108(2) (2005) (immunity from negligence liability to convicted prisoners absent serious bodily injury or 
death, excepting medical malpractice); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-1 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(24) (2005); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(25) (2005) (absent gross negligence); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-21-8 (Michie 2005); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(j) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(14) (2005) (local governments). 
42 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820-.02(A)(2) –(3) (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.8 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 
6-904A(2) (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/4-106  (2004)  (local governments and employees); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-
3(17) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6102(1) (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(i) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-
12.1-03(3)(f) & 32-12.2-02(3)(f) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(22), (24) & (25) 
(2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(21) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-21-9 (Michie 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-
307(a)(2)( 2005) (state); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 296a (2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(13) (20005). 
43 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(c) (2006) (municipal employees); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 850-850.4 (West 
2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-412 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 10/5-101 to 5-103 (2004)  (local governments and 
employees); IOWA CODE § 670.4(11) (2005) (local governments and employees); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(j) (2005); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793.1 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-604  (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
258, § 10(g) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(c) (2005); N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 205-b (McKinney 2005) (volunteer 
firefighters immune absent willful negligence or malfeasance); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(3)(f) (2005)  (local 
governments and employees); id. § 32-12.2-02(3)(f) (state and state employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-47-70 (2005); 
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 9.60, 2743.01(A) & (E), 3737.221(West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 33-15-38 (Michie 
2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055(2) & (3) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301(5)(o) & 
(p) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(5) (2005) (local governments). 
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emergency,44 a failure to provide adequate medical care,45 and specified unintentional torts.46 Some 
immunity statutes, rather than granting categorical immunities, delineate the circumstances under 
which governmental defendants can be held liable, usually involving injuries caused by the condition 
or use of public property, and otherwise grant immunity.47 In addition, 42 states limit the damages 
 
44 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(2) (2006) (state and state employees); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 855.4 (West 2004); 
IDAHO CODE § 6-904(2) (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 6-104 (2004) (local governments and employees); IOWA CODE § 
669.14(3) (2004) (state and state employees); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(k) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219(3) 
(2005) (state immunity); id. § 13-910(6) (local governments and employees); N.H. REV. STAT. § 541B:17-a(I) (2005) (state 
and authorized state employees acting in good faith and not willful, wanton, or grossly negligent); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:6-3 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(18) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-201(2) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 5601(e)(3) (2005) (state). 
45 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 855.4 & 855.6 (West 2004)  (failure to diagnose); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 10/6-
105 & 6-106 (2004)  (local governments and employees immune for failure to diagnose); MINN. STAT. § 3.736(3)(l) 
(2005) (state and state employees immune for hospitals and correctional facilities where reasonable use is made of 
available appropriations); id. § 466.03(11) (same for local governments and employees); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(r) 
(2005) (lack of adequate personnel or facilities if reasonable use is made of appropriations); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:6-2 & 
6-4 to 6-6 (West 2005) (failure to provide adequate personnel or facilities and failure to diagnose).  
46 See IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(14) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8111(1)(E) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41.0334 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. § 541-B:19(d) (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(17) (2005); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8546(2) (West 2005); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(12) (2005) (local governments). 
47 See ALA. CODE § 11-47-190 (2005) (municipalities liable for torts of employees within the scope of 
employment and for conditions on streets, alleys, and public ways); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (2005) (public entitles 
liable for the operation of non-emergency vehicles, hospitals, jails, correctional facilities, dangerous conditions in public 
buildings or roadways); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4012 (2005) (municipal liability for ownership, use or maintenance of 
vehicles, equipment or aircraft, construction, operation or maintenance of buildings, or the sudden and accidental 
discharge of pollutants); id. § 4011(c) (municipal employees liable for willful, wanton, or malicious conduct); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 2-412 (2006) (district liable for damages caused by operation of a vehicle); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,  § 8104-
(A)(1)(A-G) (2005) (negligent act or omission in the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle, mobile equipment, 
trailers, aircraft, watercraft, snowmobiles, machinery, equipment, negligent construction, maintenance, or operation of a 
public building, negligent and sudden or accidental discharge of pollutants, negligent construction, cleaning or repair on 
any highway, sidewalk, parking area, bridge, airport runway, or traffic control device); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 
691.1402(1), 691.1407, 691.1405, 691.1407(4), 691.1413, 691.1417(3) (2005) (state and local governments immune except 
for proprietary functions, negligent operation of motor vehicles, negligent medical care except for hospitals owned by 
department of community health or department of corrections, overflow of sewer drains caused by a negligent failure to 
repair, and negligent maintenance of highways); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 537.600 & 537.610.1 (2006) (state and local 
governments liable for operation of motor vehicles, dangerous conditions on public property, and to the extent 
insurance is available); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-5 to -12 (2005) (governmental liability for negligence of public 
employees in the operation of vehicles, aircraft, or watercraft; the operation or maintenance of public property or 
equipment, airports, public utilities and waste disposal, health care facilities, health care service, construction and 
maintenance of bridges, roadways, culverts, highways, streets, alleys, sidewalks, parking areas; and for battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation, violation of property 
rights, or a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or 
New Mexico caused by law enforcement officers within the scope of duty); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-42, 153A-435 & 
160A-485 (2005) (local governments and employees immune extent to the extent they purchase insurance); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8522 (West 2005) (state and state employees can be liable for negligence in operation of vehicles; medical 
malpractice; care, custody, or control of personal property; real estate, highways and sidewalks; potholes and other 
dangerous conditions; care, custody or control of animals; state liquor store sales; military activities, toxoids and 
vaccines); id. § (local governments liable for negligence in operation of vehicles; care, custody, or control of personal 
property and real property; trees, traffic controls and street lighting; utility service facilities; streets; sidewalks; and care, 
custody and control of animals); TENN. CODE ANN. §§  29-20-201 & 29-201-202 (2005) (local governments immune 
absent willful or wanton conduct or gross negligenceand for operation of vehicles, or unsafe conditions of public 
13 
recoverable from a governmental defendant or a public employee.48 
property); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301 (2005) (waiving immunity for damage to property held for purposes of 
forfeiture, defective or dangerous conditions of public property except when latent, and negligent acts of public 
employees); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.05, 893.81, 893.83 (West 2005) (local governments liable for mob or riot except on 
freeways or public property absent contributory negligence and for failure to repair highways up to $50,000 and for 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-39-104 to -108 (2005) (liability for operation of a vehicle, 
aircraft,watercraft, building, recreation area, park, airport, public utility, hospitals or outpatient health care negligent 
provision of health care; and tortious conduct of police officers); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 663 N.W.2d 715 
(Wis. 2003) (permitting only actions against public officers involving ministerial duties, duties to address a known danger, 
actions involving professional medical discretion and actions that are malicious, willful, and intentional). 
48 See ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-62, 41-9-68 & 41-9-70 (2005) (claims against the State heard by the Board of 
Adjustment subject to workers compensation caps); id. § 11-93-2 ( $100,000 per claimant or $300,000 per occurrence 
against local governments); ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.270 (2006) (permitting the Department of Administration to approve 
payment or recommend an appropriation to the legislature); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10-204 & 19-10-215 (2006) (claims 
against the state heard by the State Claims Commission that can award up to $10,000 except for death and disability); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114 (2005) ($150,000 per person and $600,000 per incident); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-142 & 
4-159 (2004) (claims against the State heard by Office of Claims Commissioner who can award up to $7,500 or 
recommend a greater award to the legislature); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4013 (2005) ($300,000 per occurrence); FLA.
STAT. § 768.28(5), (8) (2005) ($100,000 per claimant and $200,000 per occurrence); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-29(b) (2005) 
($1 million per plaintiff and $3 million per occurrence against the state); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-924 & 6-926 (2005) 
($500,000 per occurrence unless the defendant has purchased additional insurance); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/8 
(2004) (claims against the State heard by the Court of Claims with a $100,000 cap per claimant except for operation of 
state vehicles); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-4(a) (2005) ($300,000 per person for actions accruing before 2006, $500,000 per 
person for actions accruing before 2008, and $700,000 for actions accruing thereafter, and a $5,000,000 cap per 
occurrence when multiple persons are injured or killed); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105(a) (2005) ($500,000 per incident); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.070, 44.072 (2005) (claims against the state heard by the Board of Claims that can award 
$200,000 per person and $350,000 per incident but no noneconomic damages); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106(B) 
(2005) ($500,000 per person plus the payment of future medical benefits); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 12-104(a)(2) 
(2006) ($200,000 per person against the state); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303(a)(1) (2006) ($200,000 per 
person and $500,000 per incident against local governments); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8105(1) (2005) ($400,000 
per occurrence); id. § 8104-D (negligence liability of public employees capped at $10,000 per occurrence); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (2005) ($100,000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.6419(1), 691.1407 (2005) (claims against the State heard 
by the Court of Claims with a $ 1,000 cap); MINN. STAT. § 3.736(4)(b) & 466.04(1)(a) (2005) ($1,000,000 per occurrence 
and $300,000 for wrongful death except for securities cases, where cap is $100,000 per person and $500,000 for all 
claimants with respect to securities of the same series); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15(2)(c) (2005) ($500,000 per 
occurrence); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.610.1(2) (2006) ($300,000 per plaintiff and $2 million per occurrence); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 2-9-108(1) (2005) ($750,000 per claim and $1.5 million per occurrence); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,209, -8,211, -
8,214 & -8,215 (2005) (claims against the state heard by the State Claims Board, which must unanimously approve claims 
exceeding $5,000 and requiring judicial review of claims approved for more than $25,000); id. §§ 13-915 & -922 
($1,000,000 per person and $5,00,000 per incident against local governments and employees); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
41.035 (2005) ($50,000); N.H. REV. STAT. § 541-B:14 (2005) ($250,000 per claimant and $2,000,000 per incident against 
state or state employees); id. §507-B:4 ($150,000 per claimant and $500,000 per incident against local governments and 
employees); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(A) (2005) ($100,000 per occurrence for property damage, $300,000 per 
occurrence for medical expenses, and $400,000 per person or $750,000 per occurrence for all other damages); N.Y. CT.
CL. ACT LAW § 9 (McKinney 2005) (claims against state and local governments heard by the Court of Claims); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291, 143-299.1, 143-299.2 143-299.4, 143-300.1, 143-300.6 & 143-3001A (2005) (referring claims 
against the state, its agencies and employees, and board of education and their employees arising out of the operation of 
public school transit to the Industrial Commission with contributory negligence as a defense against all claims except 
those based on smallpox vaccinations, and capping damages at $150,000 per person plus the agencies’ share of lapsed 
salaries, with an absolute cap of $500,000 per occurrence absent excess insurance); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(3)(2) 
(2005) ($250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence against local governments); id. § 32-12.2-02(2) ($250,000 per 
person and $1,000,000 per occurrence against the state absent legislative appropriation); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2743.02(D) (West 2005) (state sued in Court of Claims with reduction of recovery for collateral recoveries by plaintiff); 
id. § 2744.05(B) (limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000 against local governments and reducing award for collateral 
recoveries); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(2005) (property damage at $25,000 per person, $125,000 for other losses and 
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State statutes usually grant public employees additional protections from the threat of 
liability.49 Public employers are usually required to indemnify their employees or otherwise pay 
judgments against those employees arising from torts committed within the scope of their 
employment, although indemnity is generally not required in cases of egregious individual 
misconduct.50 Like the FTCA, some states bar actions against public employees based on tortious 
 
$175,000 for cities with a population of 300,000 or more, $200,000 for medical negligence, and $175,000 for a wrongful 
felony conviction); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (2005) ($50,000 per person for property damage, $100,000 per person for 
special and $100,000 general damages for personal injuries, and $500,000 in the aggregate arising from a single incident); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528(b) (West 2005) ($250,000 per person and $1,000,000 aggregate against state and state 
employees); id. §§ 8549 & 8553(b) (damages against local governments and employees capped at $500,000 in the 
aggregate with reduction for collateral recoveries); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 & 9-31-3 (2005) ($100,000 except for 
proprietary functions); id. § 24-5-13(b) (capping local governmental liability for potholes at $300); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
78-190 (2005) ($300,000 per person and $600,000 per occurrence and at $1.2 million per occurrence for medical 
malpractice); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-22-8, 3-22-10, 21-32-16, 21-32-19, 21-32A-1 (Michie 2005) (permitting liability 
of state up to $2,000 and other liability only for other than punitive damages to the extent the defendant is covered by 
insurance and capping payouts from risk pools through structured settlements at 2% per year or $200,000 per claim per 
year);  TENN. CODE ANN. §§  9-8-307(e) &  9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (2005) (referring specified claims against state to the Claims 
Commission with a cap of $300,000 per claimant and $1,000,000 per occurrence and other claims against state to Board 
of Claims with $1,000,000 aggregate cap); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023(a) (Vernon 2005) (limiting 
state liability to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence); id. § 101.023(b) (limiting non-municipal local 
government liability to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence for personal injury and $100,000 per 
occurrence for property damage); id. § 101.023(c) (limiting municipal liability to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per 
occurrence for personal injury and $100,000 per occurrence for property damage); id. § 108.002 (limiting public 
employee liability to $100,000 for personal injury, death, or deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity, and $100,000 
for property damage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-604(1) (2005) (personal injury capped at $553,500 per person and 
$1,107,000 per occurrence; property damage capped at $221,400 per occurrence); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie 
2005) (damages against state capped at $100,000 or available insurance); W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2-2 & 14-2-13 (2005) 
(claims against the state heard by the Court of Claims which can issue judgments within appropriated limits);  id. §§ 29-
12-1 to -18 (Board of Risk and Insurance Management shall acquire reasonable insurance and insurer may not assert 
sovereign immunity); id. § 29-12A-7(b) (2005) (capping noneconomic damages at $500,000 per person); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.80(3) (West 2005) ($50,000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-118(a) (2005) ($250,000 per plaintiff and $500,000 per 
incident). 
49 In some states, sovereign immunity can be circumvented by suing an individual public employee in tort 
when the claim is deemed to be based on the employee’s abuse of authority through his own wrongful conduct.  See, e.g.,
Curry v. Woodstock Slag Co., 6 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1942); Currie v. Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980-82 (Ill. 1992); Guffey v. 
Cann, 766 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1989); Morell v. Balasubramanian, 514 N.E.2d 1101, 1102 (N.Y. 1987).  See also Coffee County 
School Dist. v. Snipes, 454 S.E.2d 149, 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (local employees lack immunity for negligent 
performance of ministerial functions or acts undertaken maliciously or with intent to injure). 
50 See ALA. CODE § 11-47-24 (2005) (local employees indemnified up to specified caps); ARIZ REV. STAT. §§ 
12-820-04 & 41-621-(P) (2006) (excepting punitive damages); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-203(a) (2006) (excepting 
intentional misconduct and punitive damages); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825 (West 2004)  (excepting intentional misconduct); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (2005) (excepting intentional misconduct); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-141d(a) & 7-465 
 (2005) (excepting intentional misconduct); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4002 (2005) (state employees); D.C. CODE ANN. §
1-109(a) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-90-22(a) (2005) (authorizing local governments to indemnify employees); IDAHO 
CODE § 6-903(b)-(c) (2005) (absent malice or criminal intent); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/9-102 (2004) (local employees 
indemnified for compensatory damages); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5 (2005); id. § 34-13-4(1) (discretion to indemnify civil 
rights violations); IOWA CODE §§ 669.21-22 (2004) (state employees indemnified absent willful and wanton conduct); id. 
§ 670.8 (local employees absent willful or wanton misconduct except for punitive damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109 
(2005) (absent fraud or malice and excepting punitive damages); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2005 (2005) (municipal 
employees absent fraud, malice, or corruption ); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.1 (2005) (state employees); MD. CODE 
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conduct occurring within the scope of their public employment.51 Thus, governments and public 
 
ANN., STAT GOV’T § 12-404 (2006) (authorizing indemnification of state employees); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-303 (2006) (authorizing indemnification of local employees and making local governments liable on claims 
against employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (2005) (requiring indemnification when employer is liable absent 
criminal conduct, permitting indemnification when employer is not liable or for actions under federal law); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258, § 9 (2005) (authorizing indemnity up to $1,000,000 absent gross negligence, willful or malicious conduct); 
id. § 9A (requiring indemnification of state police up to $1,000,000 absent gross negligence, willful or malicious conduct); 
 id. § 13 (permitting municipalities to adopt by referendum mandatory indemnification up to $1,000,000 absent 
intentional violation of civil rights); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1408(1) (2005) (authorizing indemnification); MINN STAT.
§ 3.736(9) (2004) (state employees); id. § 466.07 (local employees absent malfeasance, willful neglect of duty, or bad 
faith); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-5 & 11-46-7(3) (2005) (absent fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation, or a criminal 
offense); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.711(2)(2) (2006) (state employees); id. § 18 (local employees indemnified absent 
intentional misconduct or recklessness); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (2005) (absent oppression, fraud, malice, criminal 
conduct); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,239.05 (2005) (state employees excepting intentional misconduct);  id. § 13-1801 (local 
employees except when their acts are unlawful); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0349 (2005) (absent wanton or malicious 
conduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:10-1 (West 2005) (state employees indemnified except for punitive damages or criminal 
conduct); id. § 10-4 (authorizing indemnification of local employees absent fraud, malice, willful misconduct or 
intentional wrongdoing); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 29-A:2 & 99-D:2 (2005) (state and county employees excepting intentional 
misconduct); id. §§ 31-105-06 & 29A:2 (authorizing municipalities to indemnify employees for accidental injuries and 
requiring indemnification for judgments involving civil rights violations committed without malice); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-4-4(C)-(E) (2005) (granting a right of contribution from an employee guilty of fraud or intentional malice); N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW § 17(2) (McKinney 2005) (state employees indemnified absent intentional misconduct); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143-300.3 (2005) (authorizing indemnification of state employees absent fraud, malice or corruption); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 32-12.1-04(4) & 32-12.2-03(4) (2005) (excepting punitive damages); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.87 (West 2005) (state 
employees up to $1,000,000 per occurrence absent malice, bad faith, wanton or reckless conduct, or for punitive 
damages); id. § 2744.07(A) (indemnity for local employees); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 160, 162 (2005) (except for punitive 
damages absent fraud, corruption, or discriminatory animus and when the employee was acting in good faith and 
consistent with applicable written policies known to the employee); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.285 (2005) (absent malfeasance 
in office of willful or wanton neglect of duty); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West 2005) (local employees 
indemnified absent crime, fraud, malice, or willful misconduct); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-12(a) & 45-15-16 (2005) 
(authorizing indemnification); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-11-440 (2005) (requiring indemnification of employees of the State 
Budget and Control Board and Retirement Systems Investment Panel); id. § 12-4-325(A) (requiring indemnification of 
officers of the Department of Revenue); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-19-1 to -3 (Michie 2005) (authorizing indemnity); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§  9-8-112(a) (2005) (state employees absent willful, intentional, or malicious conduct); id. § 29-20-
310 (local employees indemnified absent willful, malicious, or criminal conduct, or conduct for personal financial gain); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 102.002 (Vernon 2005) (local employees indemnified for negligence up to 
specified caps); id. § 104.001 (state employees indemnified up to specified caps for negligence, deprivations of rights, 
privileges or immunities absent bad faith, conscious indifference, or reckless disregard, or determination of Attorney 
General); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-603(1)(b) (2005) (absent fraud, willful misconduct, driving while intoxicated or 
impaired, or perjury);  VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-1837 (Michie 2005) (requiring insurance for state employees); id. § 15.2-
1520 (authorizing indemnification of local employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601(b) (2005) (state employees absent 
gross negligence or willful misconduct with indemnification capped at $250,000 per person and $1,000,000 per 
occurrence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 901a(b) (2005) (municipal employees indemnified absent willful or intentional 
misconduct);WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.92.075 & 4.96.041(2005) (absent bad faith); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-11(a)(2) (2005) 
(local employees); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104(c) (2005) (indemnification up to 
damages caps); Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(construing Florida law to require indemnification absent intentional misconduct); Livesay v. Baltimore County, 862 A.2d 
33, 38 (Md. 2004) (construing Maryland law to require indemnification of local employees). 
51 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.253 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-305(a) (2005) (except when liability 
insurance is available or for malicious acts or omissions); FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5-9)(a) (2005) (absent bad faith, malice, or 
willful and wanton conduct); GA. STAT. ANN. § 50-21-25(a) (2005) (state employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-10 (2005) 
(actions in which the employer is held liable); IND. CODE § 34-13-3-45 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
522(b) (2006) (state employees absent malice or gross negligence); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (2005); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 691.1407(2) (2005) (when employee reasonably believed she was within the scope of authority, the public 
employer was engaged in a governmental function, and the employee’s conduct does not involve gross negligence); MISS.
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employees are free to engage in a broad swath of tortious activities without fear of liability.   
3. Asymmetry with private tort liability – The justification for government immunity is far from 
self-evident; indeed, the vast majority of scholars attack it as improperly undermining the rule of 
law.52 One of the few academic defenders of immunity is Roderick Hills, who has argued that 
immunity protects the public fisc from the improvidence of public officials whom, he believes, lack 
sufficient incentive to protect the public fisc from damages awards.53 But the truth of this 
supposition is far from evident.  After all, elected officials have substantial political incentives to 
keep taxes low and to avoid unnecessary government expenditures, and Professor Hills develops no 
argument to explain why these incentives are insufficient to restrain profligate government litigation 
costs.  Harold Krent has offered a different justification for immunity, claiming that it preserves the 
separation of powers by ensuring that legislative or executive policy is not undermined by damages 
awards.54 But this argument has a cart-before-the-horse quality; it does not explain why legislative or 
executive prerogatives properly include the power to engage in tortious conduct without paying the 
injured party compensation.  In any event, this argument does not justify immunity in cases when 
the plaintiff’s injury is caused by a violation of the Constitution.  After all, it is considered the 
 
CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(2) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305(5)-( MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305(5)-6) (2005) (actions 
in which the employer is held liable);6) (2005) (actions in which the employer is held liable); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
9.86 (West 2005) (suit against state employees absent malice, bad faith, wanton or reckless conduct); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.265(1) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-12(b) (2005) (suit against state employees barred absent fraud, willful 
misconduct, or malice); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-70 (2005) (absent fraud, malice, intent to harm, or a crime of moral 
turpitude); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-17 (Michie 2005) (suit against state employees barred although immunity for 
ministerial acts held unconstitutional in Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896 (S.D. 1995)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(h) 
(2005) (state employees absent willful, malicious, or criminal acts); id. § 29-20-310(b) (2005) (local employees except 
medical malpractice); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-202(3) (2005) (absent fraud, willful misconduct, driving while 
intoxicated or impaired, or perjury); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 & (Michie 2005) (state); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 901a 
(2005) (suit against state employees barred absent gross negligence or willful misconduct); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 
901a(b) (2005) (suit against municipal employees barred absent willful or intentional misconduct); W. VA. CODE § 29-
12A-5(b) (2005) (local employees not liable absent malice, bad faith or wanton and reckless conduct); State v. Chase 
Securities Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 599-600 (W. Va. 1992) (state officials immune if they did not violate clearly established 
law). 
52 See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091, 1101-08; Erwin 
Chemirinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1210-16 (2001); Jackson, supra note 10, at 572-605; Mark 
C. Niles, Nothing But Mischief: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275 
(2002); Randall, supra note 11, at 96-103.  
53 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as a Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1234-
35 (2001). 
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province of the judiciary to define the scope of legislative or executive power under the 
Constitution.55 Thus, the constitutional tort merits separate consideration. 56 
B. Constitutional Torts 
Liability for constitutional torts turns on whether the defendant is the federal government, a 
state, or a unit of local government, and whether suit is brought against the government itself or a 
public employee. 
1.  Federal liability -- Sovereign immunity bars an action seeking to recover damages from the 
federal government itself for a constitutional tort.57 The federal employee who actually committed 
the tort, however, is in a different legal position.  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics,58 the Supreme Court held that federal officials are liable for damages when they 
violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.59 A damages remedy is available absent what the Court 
regards as “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,”60 
or the availability of a more limited statutory remedy nevertheless deemed to be adequate.61 
Constitutional tort damages are not based on the presumed or intrinsic value of constitutional rights; 
they can be awarded only for what the common law of torts considers an actual and compensable 
 
54 See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1541-60 (1992).  
55 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); 
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980). 
56 The phrase “constitutional tort” refers to actions seeking damages for a violation of the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U.L. 
REV. 277 (1965). 
57 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).  
58 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
59 See id. at 395-97.  Bivens involved an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, but its holding has since been 
applied to other constitutional provisions.  See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-06 (1978).  
60 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.  Accord, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679-86 (1987) (rejecting claim of 
former Army sergeant to recover damages caused by administration of drug as part of experimental program); Chappell 
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (rejecting race discrimination claim by Navy personnel against superior officers). 
61 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (rejecting Bivens claim for consequential damages caused 
by wrongful denial of disability benefits in light of statutory remedy limited to an award of benefits); Bush v. Lucas, 462 
U.S. 367 (1983) (rejecting Bivens claim for consequential damages caused by wrongful demotion of federal employee in 
light of statutory remedies limited to backpay and retroactive seniority).  Bivens liability, however, is limited to federal 
employees.  Even when sovereign immunity has been waived, no constitutional tort claim is recognized against the 
federal government or federal agencies because the remedy against individual employees is thought sufficient to protect 
the victims of constitutional torts. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994).  See also Correctional Services Corp. 
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loss.62 
Individual federal officials sued for constitutional torts are entitled to assert the defense of 
qualified immunity.63 Under this doctrine, officials enjoy immunity unless their conduct 
contravened clearly established constitutional law.64 Qualified immunity is unavailable when prior 
decisional law makes the illegality of an official’s conduct manifest or when the official undertakes 
conduct that no reasonable person could think was constitutional despite the absence of controlling 
precedent.65 The risk that the vigorous performance of public employees’ duties will be inhibited by 
the threat of personal liability is thought to justify the defense of qualified immunity.66 
2.  State and local liability -- States enjoy immunity from damages liability for constitutional 
torts by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, which, despite its textual limitation to cases involving 
citizens of different states,67 is thought to incorporate a general principle of sovereign immunity.68 
The Eleventh Amendment is construed, however, to permit Congress to authorize damages actions 
against states under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.69 Moreover, the Eleventh 
 
v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70-72 (2001). 
62 See Memphis Cmty Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-08 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-58 
(1978).  
63 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-15 (1982).  There are some officials, however, who are entitled 
to absolute immunity.  The President enjoys absolute immunity from damages liability arising from the performance of 
his duties, members of Congress and their staffs are absolutely immune from civil liability for what are deemed to be 
legislative acts, judges and other adjudicative officials enjoy absolute immunity for their adjudicative functions, and 
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for what are deemed prosecutorial acts.  See id. at 807.   
64 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 817-19 (1982). 
65 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-44 (2002); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615-18 (1999); Mitchell v. 
Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 530-35 (1985).  
66 See, e.g., Richardson v.  McKnight, 520 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1992); 
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1988); Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985). 
67 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
68 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-30 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 
(1996).  The Eleventh Amendment is understood to preclude Congress from compelling states to defend damages 
actions for an alleged violation of federal law even in a state court.  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-54. 
69 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 519-20 (2004); Nevada Department of  Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003).   
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Amendment does not protect state officials from personal liability for constitutional torts.70 State 
officials are also considered “persons” amenable to suit for depriving the plaintiff of rights under the 
Constitution or federal law under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.71 State 
officials sued for constitutional torts may assert qualified immunity as a defense to their personal 
liability.72
Local governments are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment73 and are amenable to 
suit under section 1983.74 Section 1983, however, has been construed to reject vicarious municipal 
liability for the constitutional torts of municipal employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.75 Instead, local governments can be held liable only for their own policies or customs 
or for the acts of municipal policymakers.76 Curiously, this is precisely the basis on which 
discretionary immunity is availability for common law tort liability; in that context, the touchstone 
for immunity is whether the challenged decision involves a judgment rooted in government policy.77 
But while discretionary immunity applies no matter how likely government policy is to inflict 
tortious injury within the meaning of the common law of torts, municipal liability for constitutional 
torts is imposed when a municipal policy or custom is unconstitutional or reflects deliberate 
 
70 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29-31 (1991); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).  Moreover, 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution prevents states from enacting immunity laws that can be used as 
defenses in section 1983 litigation.  See, Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-78 (1990); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141-
45 (1987); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 & n.8 (1980). 
71 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1991).  In contrast, the Court has held that a state is not considered a 
“person” amenable to suit under section 1983.  See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).  
Section 1983 provides: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or useage, of any State . . .  
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . shall 
be liable to the person injured . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
72 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-49 (1974). 
73 See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001); Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
74 See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  
75 See id. at 691-95.  
76 See, e.g., Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); City of Canton 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989).  
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indifference to constitutional violations by municipal employees.78 Local governments, moreover, 
may not assert the defense of qualified immunity,79 although they enjoy immunity from punitive 
damages.80 Precisely the opposite liability rules apply to local officials sued for constitutional torts; 
they can assert the defense of qualified immunity,81 but are subject to awards of punitive damages 
for intentional or reckless misconduct.82
3.  Asymmetry with private tort liability -- The immunity doctrines for constitutional torts have 
for the most part been devised by the Supreme Court.83 The Court, however, has made little effort 
to explain why it grants government tortfeasors defenses unavailable in private tort law; and the 
rather slender efforts the Court has made along these lines are strikingly unpersuasive.  In Richardson 
v. McKnight,84 for example, as it held that the employees of a private firm hired to run a state prison 
were not entitled to assert qualified immunity, the Court wrote:    
 First, the most important special government-immunity producing concern – unwarranted 
timidity [caused by fear of personal liability] – is less likely present, or at least is not special, 
when a private company subject to competitive market pressures operates a prison.  
Competitive pressures mean not only that a firm whose guards are too aggressive will face 
damages that raise costs, thereby threatening its replacement, but also that a firm whose 
guards are too timid will face threats of replacement by other firms with records that 
demonstrate their ability to both a safer and more effective job . . . .  This is not to say that 
government employees, in their efforts to act within constitutional limits, will always, or 
often, sacrifice the otherwise effective performance of their duties.  Rather, it is to say that 
government employees typically act within a different system.  They work within a system that 
is responsible through elected officials to voters who, when they vote, rarely consider the 
performance of individual subdepartments or civil servants specifically and in detail.  And 
that system is often characterized by multidepartment civil service rules that, while providing 
employee security, may limit the incentives or ability of individual departments or 
supervisors to reward, or to punish, individual employees.  Hence a judicial determination 
 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323-26 (1991). 
78 See Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405-08 (1997); Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123-24 (1992); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386-89 (1989).  
79 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).  
80 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-70 (1981).  
81 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654-57 (1980). 
82 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).  
83 The Court has sometimes derived the immunity rules for constitutional torts from the governmental 
immunity and liability in effect when section 1983 was enacted, see, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S 259, 268 (1993), 
but it has altered these rules if they are come to be viewed as counterproductive or otherwise inadvisable.  See, e.g.,
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). 
84 521 U.S. 399 (1997).  
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that effectiveness concerns warrant special immunity-type protection in respect to this latter 
(governmental) system does not prove its need with respect to the former.  Consequently, 
we can find no special immunity-related need to encourage vigorous performance.  Second, 
“privatization” helps to meet the immunity-related need “to ensure that talented candidates” 
are “not deterred by the threat of damages suits from entering public service.”  . . .  
[I]nsurance increases the likelihood of employee indemnification and to that extent reduces 
the employment-discouraging fear of unwarranted liability potential applicants face.  Because 
privatization law also frees the private prison-management firm from many civil service law 
restraints, it permits the private firm, unlike a government department, to offset any 
increased employee liability risk with higher pay or extra benefits.  In respect to this second 
government-immunity-related purpose then, it is difficult to find a special need for immunity, 
for the guards’ employer can operate like other private firms; it need not operate like a 
typical government department.  Third, lawsuits may well “distrac[t]” these employees “from 
their duties,” but the risk of distraction alone cannot be a sufficient grounds for immunity.85 
This passage argues that a private firm’s employees are not likely to be overdeterred by the 
threat of liability because they will be indemnified, but offers no support for its claim that 
indemnification is less likely to exist in the public sector.  In fact, indemnification is nearly always 
offered to public employees by statute, policy, or collective bargaining agreement,86 a fact well 
known to the author of Richardson, since he recited it in another case decided during the very same 
Term.87 The ubiquity of employee indemnification should be unsurprising; labor economics teaches 
that employers must offer sufficient compensation to account for the risk of liability that employees 
face, and will choose indemnification to address this problem to avoid concern that their employees’ 
financial interests in avoiding liability will reduce their productivity.88 There is also little reason to 
credit the Court’s assertion that public employers cannot cope with overdeterrence – public 
managers are accountable to elected officials, who have political incentives to enhance the 
performance of government agencies.  Nor did the Court identify any civil service rule which 
 
85 Id. at 410-11 (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
86 See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The 
Conundrum and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 587, 590-96 (2000); Neal Miller, Less-than-Lethal Force 
Weaponry: Law Enforcement and Correctional Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive Force, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV.
733, 749-52 (1995); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability under 
Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76-77 (1999); Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify Officer’s § 
1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1216-1223 (2001); Nicole G. Tell, Note, Representing 
Police Officers and Municipalities: A Conflict of Interest for a Municipal Attorney in a Section 1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2836 (1997).  State indemnification statutes are set out at note 44, supra.
87 See Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 436 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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prevents public employers from firing those who engage in tortious misconduct or rewarding those 
who improve agency performance.89 
Thus, we are left with little in the way of a rationale for special rules of governmental 
immunity.90 But if we credit the Court’s view that the voters have little ability to evaluate the 
performance of government agencies and that public-sector supervisors have little control over their 
subordinates, then the rationale for government damages liability itself is thrown into doubt.  If 
neither the voters nor supervisors have much ability to punish public employees who commit torts, 
and given that government can readily recoup its legal expenses by levying taxes, it is hard to see any 
justification for government tort liability – it neither deters wrongdoing nor shifts costs to culpable 
parties.   At most, government liability offers an injured party compensation, but if that is its only 
virtue, surely this objective could be achieved through a system of publicly funded insurance with far 
lower transaction costs than those inhering in a system of tort liability.91 
C. Takings. 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides:  “Nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”92 Since the Fifth Amendment’s text mandates the provision 
of just compensation for anything that amounts to a “taking,” presumably no rules of immunity 
from the obligation to provide compensation can survive constitutional attack under the Fifth 
Amendment itself.  This is largely an academic question, however, since the federal government has 
 
88 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1239-43 (1984). 
89 Justice Scalia made many of these points in his dissenting opinion.  See 520 U.S. at 418-21. For additional 
criticism of Richardson, see Clayton P. Gilette & Paul B. Stephan, Richardson V. McKnight and the Scope of Immunity after 
Privatization, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 103 (2000). 
90 An additional justification sometimes offered for qualified immunity is that it reduces the costs of adopting a 
new rule of constitutional law by immunizing the government from damages liability for conduct preceding adoption of 
the new rule.  See John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999).   But the more 
straightforward way to address this concern is through the law of retroactivity, and on that score the Supreme Court has 
held that new rules of constitutional law are applicable to all cases pending at the time the new rule is announced.  See 
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1993).  Moreover, municipalities are denied qualified 
immunity even when their policies do not violate clearly established law.  See text at note 79, supra.
91 This point, for example, is at the core of the case for no-fault automobile insurance.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14 (4th ed. 1992). 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. V.    
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waived whatever sovereign immunity it might otherwise have against damages liability for an 
uncompensated taking,93 and it is settled that a plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief against state 
officials for an uncompensated taking of property without compensation. 94 Thus, the ability of a 
plaintiff to obtain a remedy for an allegedly unconstitutional taking of property is not in doubt.95 
The text of the Takings Clause resolves most of the questions that vex government liability 
for common law and constitutional torts.  Unlike any other constitutional text, the Takings Clause 
imposes an unqualified obligation to pay compensation, mandating relief in the form of money 
judgments.   Accordingly, courts properly award compensation for “takings” without worrying 
about the risk of over-deterrence.  Moreover, the Takings Clause suggests a rationale for a taxpayer-
funded just compensation requirement quite apart from any conception of deterrence.  Instead of 
treating takings for a public use as a legal wrong in the sense that torts are legal wrongs that demand 
deterrence or corrective justice, the Takings Clause acknowledges the propriety of taking private 
property for public use, adding, however, that it is “just” to expect the public to provide 
compensation for the forced acquisition of property for its own use.  Thus, the compensation 
requirement responds to a concept of unjust enrichment and undue burden – the public should 
compensate those whose property is taken for its own use. 96 Common law and constitutional torts, 
in contrast, are considered legal wrongs, yet we have seen that there is great doubt that government 
 
93 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946).   
94 See Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 212-23 (1897).  This rule is an aspect of the familiar doctrine, most 
frequently associated with the decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that the Eleventh Amendment does not 
bar an action seeking injunctive relief against a state official to halt a violation of federal law.  See, e.g., Frew by Frew v. 
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004); Verizon Maryland Inc. v.Public Service Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645-48 
(2002); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29-31 (1991).  A similar rule authorizing injunctive relief against federal officials was 
employed prior to the federal waiver of sovereign immunity.  See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
95 The one exception is a plaintiff seeking a remedy for a temporary uncompensated taking.  Injunctive relief 
would be moot in such a case, but a temporary taking must be compensated.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-22 (1987). It is unclear whether the Eleventh 
Amendment, as presently construed, would protect a state against a suit seeking compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.  See Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067 (2001). 
96 Professor Michelman has provided the leading account of the just compensation requirement as rooted in its 
own conception of justice in the form of fairness to individuals put to undue burdens for the sake of others, based on 
the work of John Rawls.  See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1218-24 (1967). 
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tort liability offers either deterrence or punishment of culpable parties.  The contrast between 
government liability for takings and governmental liability for common law and constitutional torts, 
in short, only reinforces the problematic character of the latter.   Since the Constitution itself does 
not require compensation except for takings, surely we should expect some principled justification 
for a constitutional or common law tort remedy against government.  But given the crazy quilt of 
liability and immunity for constitutional and common law torts, such a justification appears elusive. 
II. THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY   
The emerging consensus among legal scholars is that the justification for government tort 
liability is essentially incoherent.  I now hope to demonstrate that the emerging consensus is quite 
wrong.  But first, a look at this emerging consensus is in order. 
 A. The Case Against Government Tort Liability 
 The case against government tort liability is straightforward— the premises and policies of 
tort law fit private tortfeasors far better than government.   
1.  Theories of tort liability -- The two major schools of thought about tort law share the 
objective of shifting losses to culpable parties.  The instrumental account justifies tort liability as 
creating an incentive to make cost-justified investments in safety.97 Thus, as Learned Hand 
famously put it, tort liability turns on whether the cost of the injury multiplied by the likelihood that 
it would occur exceeds the cost that the defendant would have had to incur to avoid the loss.98 An 
employer’s vicarious liability for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of their 
employment is necessitated by the risk that employees will prove judgment-proof, leading to 
suboptimal investments in safety absent employer liability.99 The advocates of corrective justice, in 
contrast, argue that tort law embodies a moral intuition that a wrongdoer ought to make the injured 
 
97 See, e.g., GUIDO CALEBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135-73 (1970); 
POSNER, supra note 91, § 6.1; STEVEN  SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-32 (1987). 
98 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1947).   
99 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 91, at § 6.8; Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic 
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party whole.100 Vicarious employer liability is warranted because an employee acting within the 
scope of employment is part of a larger organization that can fairly be held responsible for the 
conduct of an employee working on its behalf.101 
The justifications for constitutional tort liability are no different; the Supreme Court tells us 
that the law of constitutional torts is governed by the same principles as ordinary tort law.102 
Constitutional tort damages have an instrumental justification in that they create an economic 
incentive for the government and its officials to make cost-justified investments in preventing 
constitutional violations,103 and are justified in terms of corrective justice based on an asserted moral 
entitlement to compensation when one has been the victim of a constitutional wrong.104 As for the 
obligation to pay compensation for takings, essentially the same two justifications are advanced.  
The instrumental account contends that the Takings Clause promotes social welfare by giving 
government a disincentive to take property when the social benefits of the taking will not exceed the 
cost of paying compensation to the owner, 105 and we have seen an intrinsic account of the just 
compensation requirement contending that it embodies a moral entitlement of property owners not 
to be subjected to disproportionate burdens for the benefit of others.106 
2.  The inapplicability of conventional theory to government -- Initially, the assumption that 
government tort liability works in the same manner as the common law liability of private 
tortfeasors was widely shared.   The Supreme Court repeatedly opined that constitutional tort 
liability can be counted upon to provide compensation while deterring official misconduct in the 
 
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988). 
100 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-85 (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 145-70 (1995); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). 
101 See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 100, at 185-87.  
102 See, e.g., City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 709-10 (1999); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477, 483 (1994). 
103 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 16-19, 135-
46 (1983). 
104 See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997, 
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105 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 91, at 58-59; Michelman, supra note 96, at 1214-18 (1967); Michael A. Heller & 
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same manner as private tort law.107 Even the most astute commentators indulged the same 
assumption.108 
The attack on this citadel was launched by Daryl Levinson, who observed that unlike a 
private firm, the government is not organized to maximize profits, but respond to voters’ 
preferences, who are not “uniquely interested in maximizing the profits, or total wealth, of the 
jurisdiction.”109 Indeed, “government responds to political, not market incentives – to votes, not 
dollars.”110 Accordingly, requiring government to pay damages for constitutional torts will fail to 
reliably deter constitutional violations, which frequently produce political benefits.111 For example, a 
policy of randomly searching young men in high-crime areas could greatly increase constitutional 
tort liability, but it could also pay such handsome political dividends that liability would have no 
deterrent effect on elected officials.112 Moreover, a majoritarian theory of political behavior predicts 
that “[s]o long as the social benefits of constitutional violations exceed the compensable costs to the 
victim and are enjoyed by a majority of the population, compensation will never deter a majoritarian 
government from violating constitutional rights . . . .”113 As for the obligation to pay compensation 
for takings, Levinson argued that compensation is unlikely to create an incentive to engage in only 
efficient takings:  “[W]hy should we expect government to fully internalize the benefits of takings 
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108 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional 
Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461, 1461-64 (1998); Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under §1983: A Legal and 
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109 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 345, 355 (2000) (footnote omitted).  
110 Id. at 345.   
111 See id. at 367-68. 
112 See id. at 367-70.   
113 Id. at 370.   Levinson added that deterrence cannot be expected when a majority of citizens experience 
greater benefits than an increase in their taxes.  See id. at 370-73. 
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when it does not receive them in the form of benefits?”114 A proposed taking that imposes large 
costs on individual property owners that exceed their social benefits could nevertheless garner 
majority support when a majority perceives benefits from the taking that exceed the increase in its 
own taxes to fund compensation.115 Levinson added that public choice theory predicts that 
powerful interest groups might be able to successfully lobby for unconstitutional policies or 
improvident takings that provide them with special benefits despite the obligation to pay 
compensation, such as an influential homeowners association that might lobby to condemn nearby 
property it dislikes even though the cost of condemnation might exceed its benefits.116 Levinson 
concluded, “[t]he most consistent prediction generated by interest group analysis is that 
compensation for takings or constitutional will tend to defuse political opposition and therefore 
increase the incidence of both.”117 At best, “any predictions about the incentive effects of 
constitutional cost remedies on government behavior are highly suspect.”118 
Levinson also rejected corrective justice as a justification for government liability for 
constitutional torts or a requirement of compensation for takings.  As to the former, the fact that 
“constitutional tort compensation ultimately comes from the pockets of taxpayers attenuates the 
connection between moral responsibility and the burden of rectification.”119 One could add that 
shareholders of private corporations have the benefit of liability limited to their investment even 
though they can readily sell their stock at any time; yet taxpayers must fund essentially unlimited 
liability and face substantial costs if they wish to “exit” the jurisdictions that tax them to fund 
 
114 Id.at 350 (footnote omitted).  
115 See id. at 364-66.  He illustrated the point:  “[T]he proposed regulation will benefit each of citizens 1-6 (the 
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119 Levinson, supra note 109, at 409.  Levinson also observed that many constitutional violations are systemic 
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governmental liabilities.120 As for takings, Levinson rejected a moral claim of property owners to 
compensation on the ground that the existing distribution property cannot itself be defended as 
just.121 
Although he seemed not to realize it, Levinson’s view argues against governmental liability 
for common law torts no less than for constitutional torts and takings.  On Levinson’s account, 
there is no instrumental justification for government liability for common law torts since we cannot 
know that government will make cost-justified investments in loss prevention to minimize its future 
liability.  When the political cost of diverting public resources to loss prevention is sufficiently high, 
government will not make the investment even when cost-justified.  As a result, tort liability cannot 
be expected to promote efficient government investment in loss prevention.  And since the 
economic cost of damages awards falls on taxpayers not responsible in any direct fashion for 
tortious conduct, the corrective justice rationale for governmental damages liability for common law 
torts is also wanting.  Again, at most we are left with an argument for providing those injured by 
tortuous governmental conduct with some form of publicly funded insurance – assuming that one 
can explain why this obligation should be funded by the taxpayers rather than leaving the decision 
whether to purchase such insurance to each individual. 
The efforts made to date to defend government tort liability from Levinson’s attack have 
been unsatisfying.  For example, Bernard Dauenhauser and Mark Wells have defended constitutional 
tort liability in terms of corrective justice, arguing that the taxpayers are properly held responsible 
for government torts since they largely correspond to the universe of voters responsible for electing 
those who run the government.122 But this is hardly corrective justice from the standpoint of those 
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voter-taxpayers who chose the losing candidate in the last election.  Nor is it fair to consider the 
taxpayers a proxy for voters.  Voting is governed by a one-person one-vote rule,123 but taxes are not 
levied on that basis.124 It is also unfair to hold elected officials responsible for most governmental 
torts.  Tort liability is usually imposed without any requirement that the tort was committed with the 
involvement or culpability of elected officials; only a section 1983 claim against a municipality 
requires any showing of culpability on the part of policymakers.  Most constitutional torts, however, 
are committed by relatively low-level officials subject to limited control by elected officials or the 
voters, as the Supreme Court explained in Richardson.125 
Attacks on Levinson’s position from an instrumental perspective have been no more 
persuasive.  For example, Mark Brown has argued that citizens are more likely to obey the law when 
the government is required to honor its own legal obligations and is held liable for their violation.126 
He offers no empirical evidence to support this view, however, and his theory seems implausible.  
The Supreme Court recognized constitutional tort liability as we know it today in Monroe v. Pape.127 
While constitutional tort litigation exploded in the wake of that decision,128 there is no evidence that 
people became more law-abiding.  In fact, crime rates rose in the years following Monroe, and 
criminologists certainly have not observed any relationship between the rise of constitutional tort 
litigation and norms of law-abidingness.129 
Somewhat more plausibly, Myriam Gillies has attempted to meet Levinson on his own 
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terms.   Admitting that governmental tort liability can have little deterrent effect unless it exacts a 
political price, she claims that tort litigation does just that by unearthing damaging information or 
producing adverse verdicts or rulings that produce damaging publicity for officeholders.130 But she 
offers a paucity of empirical evidence to support this claim.  There is, for example, little reason to 
believe that civil litigation is a major vehicle for unearthing government misconduct.  Professor 
Gilles offers no evidence that damages litigation has produced effective political accountability; 
indeed, it is difficult to think of any major government scandal unearthed by tort litigation.  The 
major national scandals of recent decades, such as Watergate or the Iran-Contra affair, for example, 
were not unearthed by tort plaintiffs.131 At the local level, it is equally difficult to identify a major 
scandal unearthed by a tort plaintiff; the huge Ramparts police corruption scandal in Los Angeles, 
for example, was unearthed by the Los Angeles Police investigation.132 What is more, only a tiny 
fraction of civil litigation against the government is likely to generate publicity, much less significant 
political consequences.  When a governmental tort has political consequences, moreover, it is more 
likely because of the underlying conduct rather than the ensuing litigation.  For example, the beating 
of Rodney King by Los Angeles police officers produced an immediate and enormous adverse 
public reaction well before any civil litigation was brought arising from that incident.133 Given the 
incentive of the political opposition and the press, among others, to unearth government 
misconduct, and the ordinary political checks that come into play whenever allegations of 
government misconduct enter the political arena, the marginal utility of civil litigation in unearthing 
 
IN AMERICA (1998). 
130 See Myriam A. Gillies, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 
GA. L. REV. 845, 859-65 (2001).  Similarly, James Park has argued that awards of damages are necessary so that courts 
are able to articulate constitutional principles and rights in cases where other types of relief are unavailable. See James J. 
Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 422-40 (2003).  
131 See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974) (Watergate); LAWRENCE E. 
WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 25-53 (1993) (Iran-Contra). 
132 See Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDAL News, CHAMPION, April 2000, at 12. 
133 See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating Revives Charges of Racism, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 1991, at A18; Elaine 
Woo, Rev. Jackson Joins Call for Gates’ Ouster, Scolds Bradley; Protest: The Civil Rights Activist Tells Demonstrators at Police 
Headquarters that Mayor Should Speak Out “More Clearly and Decisively” on King Beating Controversy, L.A. TIMES, March 17, 
31 
such misconduct and punishing officeholders is not likely great.  But if it were, then Professor 
Gilles’ argument suggests that the cure may be worse than the disease.  If civil litigation is uniquely 
valuable at ferreting out government misconduct because of the financial incentive that the civil 
plaintiff has to pursue such allegations, then elected officials would presumably pay premiums – 
beyond the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff – in order to settle litigation that might 
otherwise cause political embarrassment.134 Thus, governmental tort liability effectively enables 
plaintiffs to extort excessive settlements funded with tax dollars.  That perverse result is precisely 
why Professor Hills defends sovereign immunity.135 
These responses, however, are far from the typical academic reaction to Professor 
Levinson’s critique of government damages liability.  It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say 
that Levinson has revolutionized academic thinking about governmental damages liability. 136 Most 
academics have been persuaded by Levinson; it has now become fashionable to warn that the 
consequences of imposing damages liability on government are uncertain at best.137 For this reason, 
some scholars now advocate imposing personal liability while forbidding or limiting indemnification 
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or mandating sanctions such as termination or public censure.138 Sanctioning an individual official, 
however, ignores the very dynamic that has led to a nearly-universal regime of indemnification – if 
individual officials face a credible threat of meaningful sanctions, the risk of over-deterrence would 
be quite real, and the resulting decline in the effective value of public-sector compensation would 
produce a concomitant decline in the quality of the public workforce unless compensation 
amounting to effective indemnification were offered. 139 Sanctioning individual public employees is 
no answer to Levinson.140 
When I first read Levinson’s article, I was a rather senior official in municipal government in 
Chicago.  Levinson’s claim that government damages liability has indeterminate political 
consequences did not ring true to me.  If Levinson were right, the officials within Chicago’s 
government with whom I worked should have been indifferent to municipal tort liability.  In fact, 
city government devoted enormous resources to trying to minimize liability.  Why was that so?  Why 
did Chicago pay for risk managers and a legal department that vigorously contested liability if, as 
Levinson supposed, the payment of compensation was actually an effective means of defusing 
political opposition? 
Levinson’s essential insight – that government responds to political and not market 
incentives – strikes me as indisputable.  In the private sector, a profit-maximizing actor will invest in 
loss prevention whenever that investment is likely to produce greater savings through reduced 
liability; but one cannot make a similar prediction about political actors, who are not profit-
maximizers and who externalize liabilities by levying taxes.  But one can construct a theory of 
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political behavior that explains why governmental damages liability can be reliably expected to 
encourage the government to undertake cost-justified liability-limiting measures. 
B. The Politics of Government Damages Liability 
Precisely because government responds to political and not economic incentives, an 
assessment of governmental tort liability requires an inquiry into the political significance of liability. 
1.  A theory of political behavior – Consider the following account of political behavior as it 
relates to government damages liability:   The primary objective of elected officials is to prevail in 
their next election, whether they are seeking reelection or some different, presumably higher office.  
To do this, they offer voters and other potential supporters what they believe to be an attractive mix 
of policies.  In particular, elected officials impose taxes and allocate available resources generated by 
those taxes in what they regard as a politically optimal manner.  Public resources must be distributed 
in a manner that meets the demands of actual and desired supporters, while keeping taxes at what is 
regarded as an politically optimal level.  In this fashion, elected officials seek to craft policies that a 
majority coalition will conclude have created a sufficiently high ratio of benefits to taxes paid to 
make success sufficiently probable in the next election.  It is therefore immaterial whether one 
accepts a majority-rule theory – postulating that elected officials are concerned with the views of a 
majority of their constituents – or, as the public choice literature hypothesizes, elected officials are 
likely to be more responsive to those groups with particular stakes in various public policy issues, 
recognizing that most voters have limited interests at stake in most policy issues.141 Under the 
theory advanced above, all that matters is that elected officials concern themselves with utilizing the 
public resources over which they have control to secure a likelihood success in future elections.  
On this view of political behavior, there is a very real price to tort liability.  The resources 
available for allocation in order to produce what elected officials regard as the optimal ratio of 
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governmental benefits to taxes are reduced by the funds that must be allocated to legal costs.  To 
pay judgments and other litigation expenses, officials must either raise taxes – (or incur debt in 
jurisdictions where that is permitted, which, of course, requires that additional tax revenues be 
diverted in future budgets to repay the debt with market-rate interest) -- or experience a reduction in 
the funds available for allocation in what elected officials regard as the politically optimal fashion.  
Moreover, sums paid out to judgment creditors pay particularly small political dividends since these 
plaintiffs likely view these sums as an entitlement rather than a politically-bestowed reward likely to 
produce loyalty to incumbent officials.  Thus, elected officials should be highly sensitive to tort 
liabilities.  Because there is a political incentive to maximize discretionary spending on politically 
favored constituencies while minimizing taxes, an elected official should be willing to make efficient 
investments in loss prevention in order to reduce governmental liability costs.  And the interest in 
maximizing political control over tax and spending policy is one all elected officials share, regardless 
of partisan affiliation or whether they exercise executive or legislative powers.  Indeed, this theory 
predicts that when existing immunity legislation is too weak to approximate the politically optimal 
mix of tax and spending policy, there will be political pressure – from interest groups unable to 
obtain desired benefits when resources must be allocated to litigation and from elected officials 
themselves – to enact legislation in order to respond to the voters’ tax and spending preferences. 
 2.  Assessing the theory -- How would one go about assessing the merits of the theory advanced 
above?  The starting premise – that politicians are concerned about winning the next election – is 
perhaps uncontroversial.  The view that elected officials behave in ways that enhance their 
likelihood of success in the next election could be rejected only by a “Profiles-In-Courage” model of 
elected officials discharging their duties without regard for electoral consequences.  There is little 
reason to embrace such a model; the political equivalent of natural selection will eventually oust 
elected officials who ignore constituent preferences.  In any event, political science research 
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consistently shows that reelection is one of the primary concerns of elected officials.142 
The next premise – elected officials consider their power to allocate available public 
resources an important means of building electoral support – is perhaps more doubtful.  One could 
argue that incumbent officials have other, more useful ways of building or maintaining political 
support, or that they rarely fear defeat at the next election.  Incumbents, however, face one type of 
vulnerability not shared by challengers; the voters have much more information about them as a 
consequence of their records.143 For that reason, incumbents have special incentives to utilize their 
control over tax and spending policy in order to offset the disadvantage of a concrete record that 
makes campaign promises less effective.  At the local level, as Paul Peterson has observed, 
politicians have long been concerned with allocating resources to maximize political benefits: 
 Many political controversies fall within the allocational arena.  Locational politics, 
which consumes much of the energy of urban politicians, usually involves the allocation of 
government resources to one or another part of the city.  Where should a school building be 
sited?  What should be the route of a badly needed roadway?  Should a new hospital be built 
on parkland?  The housekeeping services of government compose another set of allocational 
issues.  What streets should be cleared first?  Which sidewalks need repairing?  How often is 
the garbage to be collected?  Where should fire stations be located?  What should be city 
policy on the enforcement of parking and traffic ordinances?  Even minor tax questions are 
largely allocational issues with little effect on the city’s long-term interests. Should needed 
revenue be collected through increasing water and sewer fees, by charging admission to city 
museums, by increasing library fines, or by slightly raising the property tax? 
 
The allocational policies that have provoked the most enduring local conflict have 
related to the terms and conditions of public employment.  Their centrality in local politics 
has often been attributed to their material and divisible qualities.  Jobs can literally be divided 
into ever smaller packages and distributed to ever more specific segments of the community. 
 Policies controlling their disposition can be almost infinitely varied from one sector of 
public service to another and from one rank to another within the service.  Different groups 
can each be given their own parcel of positions, whose recruitment and promotion policies 
can be geared to that group’s interests.  The benefit, moreover, is perfectly concrete and 
material, a tangible good whose value can be fairly accurately calculated. 144 
Similarly, studies of congressional behavior consistently identify a desire on the part of members of 
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Congress to allocate public resources to the use of “pork barrel” projects that are likely to provide 
particularized benefits to their constituents.145 Studies of both executive and legislative behavior at 
the state level, while less frequent, reach the same conclusion.146 The use of these pork barrel 
policies at the state and federal level is another example of allocational politics.  Litigation costs, 
however, reduce the resources available to elected officials available for allocational politics.  For 
that reason, elected officials have reason to be sensitive to those costs. 
Even granting the concern of elected officials with maximizing the resources available for 
allocational politics, objections remain to the theory of political behavior advanced above.  For 
example, it is reasonable to believe that the time frame of concern to politicians is the next electoral 
cycle and that their political judgments are therefore made with only that time frame in mind.147 For 
that reason, elected officials might ignore litigation costs, believing that they have no real ability to 
reduce them quickly enough to affect the current electoral cycle.  Still, there is reason for skepticism 
about this view of the time horizons of public officials – most politicians likely plan long careers in 
public service and will pay a political price if they are still in office when tort judgments must be 
paid.148 
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One might also argue that litigation costs are not a sufficiently significant proportion of 
governmental budgets to be of concern to elected officials.  It is difficult to respond to this 
objection, since it is notoriously difficult to obtain information from governments about litigation-
related costs, although the available anecdotal evidence suggests that government tort litigation 
generates substantial budgetary outlays.149 For example, between 1994 and 1996, New York City 
paid some $70 million to plaintiffs in police misconduct litigation.150 The City of Los Angeles was 
required to expend the same amount to settle police misconduct litigation stemming from 
corruption in a single anti-gang unit.151 And a United States Department of Justice task force 
concluded that in the early 1980s municipalities had experienced significant financial difficulties as a 
result of rapidly escalating tort liability costs.152 At the federal level, Harold Krent has estimated that 
the discretionary function immunity saves the government several billion dollars per year.153 That 
estimate may be low.  In United States v. Gaubert,154 for example, the Court held that discretionary 
immunity barred a $100 million claim representing the loss of a single investor allegedly caused by 
federal negligence in supervising a single federally regulated bank.155 Had there been no immunity, 
the budgetary impact of liability for negligent supervision of federally regulated banks could have 
been enormous.156 But reliable statistics are difficult to find; in particular, it is difficult to know how 
much the government saves because of the cases that are never filed as a consequence of 
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immunity.157 And it is also difficult to evaluate the political magnitude of these expenditures since 
their political significance depends a comparison to the portion of governmental budgets that are 
available for discretionary distribution after fixed costs not subject to effective political control are 
disregarded – a calculation that is difficult if not impossible to make. 
It can also be argued that elected officials might have little ability to understand or control 
litigation costs.  Although most liability-creating events are the result of the actions of relatively low-
level officials, civil service protections and a variety of other arrangements insulate the bureaucracy 
from political control, leaving elected officials with limited authority over bureaucratic behavior.158 
This may mean that elected officials view litigation expenses as essentially a fixed cost over which 
they have no control.  Moreover, senior bureaucrats have an incentive to conceal problems within 
their areas of responsibility from elected officials.159 Still, elected officials must ultimately 
appropriate sufficient funds to pay for litigation expenses,  so there is reason to believe that elected 
officials at least have some knowledge of litigation costs.160 
The existence of term limits that prevent incumbents from seeking reelection in some 
jurisdictions might also be expected to reduce the concern of elected officials with the allocation of 
public resources in order to enhance future electoral prospects, although the effect of term limits is 
far from clear.  Even officials barred from seeking reelection may wish to use public resources to 
build support for election to another office or for a designated successor; party leadership may also 
seek to use pork-barrel policies in an effort to win or retain an office that must be vacated as a result 
of term limits; and by increasing the number of newly-elected officials who may feel especially 
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vulnerable at the next election, term limits may actually increase the number of incumbents 
particularly concerned about distributional politics.161 Thus, term limits do not necessarily argue 
against the theory of political behavior I have advanced. 
A final objection to the theory advanced above comes form Professor Levinson himself.  
We have seen that he believes that elected officials actually welcome tort liability as a means for 
deflecting opposition to their policies.162 If that is right, then government tort liability actually yields 
political benefits. 
 Thus, in the absence of persuasive empirical evidence, it is fairly debatable whether the 
theory of political behavior advanced in Part II.B.1 has merit, although it seems obvious to me that 
elected officials would always prefer to control the disposition of public funds rather than yielding 
control to judges and juries, if for no other reason than to be able to take credit when funds are paid 
out – even when paid as compensation to those injured by government conduct.  There is, however, 
empirical evidence available to test the reaction of elected officials to the threat of tort liability – the 
existence of tort immunity legislation.   
3.  Immunity Legislation as Empirical Evidence in Support of the Theory – We have seen that 
statutory tort immunity is ubiquitous; the federal government and forty-nine states have legislation 
offering governmental defendants substantial protection from tort liability.163 Enacting such 
legislation, however, is not politically costless; it is reasonable to expect political opposition to tort 
immunity.  From the standpoint of the economic interests of the typical voter, tort immunity 
legislation is a wash, since whatever risk of uncompensated loss an individual voter is likely to run 
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should be roughly equal to the additional taxes that the voter must pay to finance governmental 
litigation costs.  But voters might be expected to oppose tort immunity on the basis of the widely 
held belief that people who are wrongfully injured should be entitled to recover fair compensation 
from the wrongdoer – a point that corrective justice theorists0 argue reflects a deeply held moral 
intuition. 164 
Public choice theory predicts that the problems of collective action presented when the 
stakes for each individual are relatively small mean that the holders of particularly large economic 
interests in policy questions will play a disproportionate role in the political process. 165 This view 
suggests as well that interest groups with a substantial financial interest in pressing tort liability will 
be a particularly important source of political opposition to immunity.  Indeed, the plaintiffs’ bar 
acts as a potent lobby opposing legislation restricting tort liability.166 On government immunity 
issues, it could form alliances with any number of business interests that have a financial interest in 
government liability, such as trucking interests that experience losses when public roads are not4 
well designed or maintained, or when negligent or otherwise unlawful governmental licensing 
decisions shut businesses down.167 And on particular liability issues, any number of lobbies are 
likely to press for government liability, such as community organizations concerned about police 
brutality, domestic violence victims’ advocates concerned about police indifference to this issue, 
bicyclists’ advocates concerned about improving the design and maintenance of bike paths, patients’ 
rights groups concerned about the quality of service provided by public ambulances and hospitals, 
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41 
and so on.   
In contrast, other than the government itself, it is difficult to identify a lobby that should 
favor governmental tort immunity.  The insurance industry might ordinarily be expected to advocate 
for immunity, but governmental immunity works against insurance interests by limiting the ability of 
insurance companies to seek recovery from the government when its wrongful acts cause insured 
losses of to policyholders whose rights the insurers can assert through subrogation or similar 
arrangements.168 Taxpayers’ advocates and public employee unions might have some interest in this 
issue, but they would be far more likely to pursue their interests directly – by lobbying for tax cuts or 
indemnity, respectively – rather than deploying their limited resources and political capital on an 
issue that only indirectly affects their core interests.  I know of no evidence that these groups – or 
any other organized lobby aside from those controlled by elected officials – have ever taken a 
position on governmental tort immunity legislation.  Indeed, when I was in municipal government, 
we frequently tried to interest these groups in lobbying on governmental tort immunity issues; we 
never succeeded.  But even if these groups were thought to be vigorous proponents of immunity 
legislation, that point would only strengthen the theory of political behavior advanced above.  After 
all, to the extent that tort liability increases tax burdens, thereby activating the taxpayers lobby, or 
reduces the government’s ability to provide its employees with their desired compensation, thereby 
activating public employee unions, then tort liability imposes a political price on elected officials.  
4.   Corroborative evidence for the theory – Thus, empirical evidence in the form of governmental 
immunity statutes suggests that elected officials are sensitive to tort liability.  But sometimes the 
absence of legislation also supports this conclusion.  Consider the aftermath of Florida Prepaid 
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Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.169 In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that federal legislation subjecting states to damages liability for patent infringement infringed the 
Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition on damages actions against nonconsenting states.170 Given the 
strength of the patent lobby and its interest in this issue as evinced by its ability to obtain federal 
legislation on this issue, the patent lobby should have been able to secure state legislation granting 
the right to seek damages for patent infringement.  Yet such legislation has not been forthcoming.171 
It is difficult to understand this apparent lobbying failure unless state legislatures and governors 
perceive a cost to state patent infringement liability that was not apparent to Congress – which saw 
no obstacle to refusing the entreaties of the patent lobby when federal revenues were not at risk. 
The history of governmental immunity legislation provides additional support for the theory 
advanced above.  Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, there was a long history of Congress granting 
legislative relief to victims of federal torts until it found itself overwhelmed by the volume of 
requests for legislative relief.172 That is itself a fairly clear indication of the political momentum 
behind compensation.  Even since the FTCA, this political dynamic has asserted itself; after the 
Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. United States,173 held that the United States enjoyed discretionary 
immunity from liability for an explosion and fire, Congress nevertheless felt compelled to enact the 
Texas City Disaster Relief Act, with authorized compensation while mitigating the budgetary impact 
by capping permissible recovery at $25,000 per claimant.174 This history suggests that there is 
political potency to the demand that compensation be provided to the victims of government torts. 
 
169 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  
170 See id. at 635-48.  
171 See, e.g., Jason Karasik, Note, Leveling the IP Playing Field: Conditional Waiver Theory and the Intellectual Property 
Protection Restoration Act, 27 HASTINGS COMM & ENT. J. 475, 498 (2005).  
172 See, e.g., Floyd Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: Evolution From a Legislative Toward a 
Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625 (1985).  
173 346 U.S. 15 (1953).  
174 See Texas City Disaster Relief Act, ch. 864, 69 Stat. 707 (1955), amended by 73 Stat. 706 (1959).  The statute 
also did not compensate losses that had been indemnified by insurance and limited permissible attorney’s fees.  See id.   
The federal government ultimately paid $17.1 million in claims on total losses estimated from $300 million to several 
billions of dollars.  See 4 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
43 
There must be some offsetting political benefit to explain why elected officials enact immunity 
statutes that deny their constituents compensation. 
 Evidence that tort liability exacts a political price by reducing political control over public 
resources is also reflected in the pattern of immunity legislation.  If the relevant political calculus was 
a product solely of the strength of the various lobbies pressing their position on a legislature, then 
one would expect the pattern of statutory immunity to reflect the strength of the various lobbies.175 
Some of that is going on in immunity legislation – the statutes that immunize governments from 
paying damages to prisoners, for example, seem to reflect a legislative loss by a disfavored group 
lacking political influence.   But the most common categorical immunity – for discretionary 
decisions – is aimed at no particular class of plaintiffs, but instead is directly aimed at protecting the 
political prerogative to set policy.176 The same is true of the even more common caps on damages 
recoverable from governmental defendants.177 This pattern suggests that the interest in maintaining 
control over public resources drives the enactment of immunity legislation rather than the relative 
strength of competing lobbies. 
But perhaps all this is beside the point.  The existence of immunity legislation is itself the 
strongest evidence for the conclusion that government damages liability exacts a political cost.  If, as 
predicted by Levinson, elected officials were indifferent to liability, they would not bother to enact 
immunity legislation.  Even Congress, armed with the resources of the massive federal budget, has 
been unwilling to subject to federal government to unlimited tort liability.  The prevalence of 
immunity powerfully legislation suggests that tort immunity confers some sort of political advantage. 
 It follows that tort liability itself must impose some correlative political cost such that elected 
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officials perceive a political advantage in the enactment of immunity legislation. 
C.  The Impact Of Governmental Tort Liability. 
Thus, Professor Levinson is wrong to believe that government tort liability has only 
indeterminate effects.  Whatever its defects from the standpoint of corrective justice, government 
tort liability has an instrumental justification – it creates an incentive on the part of officeholders to 
allocate resources to loss prevention.  There should be a clear political incentive to invest in loss 
prevention at least when the cost of avoiding an injury is small, the likelihood of injury is great, and 
the impact of the injury on the government’s budget is likely to be large.  Similarly, the Takings 
Clause’s compensation requirement functions as a political restraint on the use of the power of 
eminent domain.  Government will not take property unless the political benefits of the taking 
exceed the political cost of compensation. 
But under the view of political behavior advanced here, Professor Levinson was right to 
claim that government tort liability has no efficiency justification comparable to the role of tort 
liability in the private sector.  In the private sector, tort liability creates an incentive to invest in loss 
prevention in order to avoid an expected greater liability, discounted to present value.  If the only 
concern of elected officials is to maximize the public resources available to be allocated consistent 
with their own political preferences, then public officials would be subject to the same incentive.  
Surely Levinson is right that voters do not use any equivalent to firm value for judging the operation 
of government; and most government expenditures have political benefits for incumbents – pork-
barrel spending being a prime example.  Therefore, there is always a political opportunity cost to 
making investments in safety – some other use of the funds, and its attendant political benefits, must 
be foregone, unless taxes are raised or, if possible, additional debt is incurred, and those options 
carry a political cost as well.  If, for example, elected officials invest greater funds in the internal 
affairs division of the police department in order to reduce police-related liability, they will have less 
money available to hire additional officers.  Accordingly, there will be substantial political 
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opportunity costs when elected officials forego the opportunity to put more police on the streets, 
even when they do so for the sake of risk management.  The political opportunity cost of spending 
additional funds on internal affairs may well be perceived to be higher than the political cost of 
failing to reduce future police-related liability – without knowing a great many things about the 
political facts on the ground, it is impossible to make confident predictions on this score.    
Aside from political opportunity costs, liability-producing conduct may have political 
benefits that offset the deterrent effect of liability.   To use Professor Levinson’s example, a program 
of aggressive stop-and-frisk of young males in high-crime areas may increase liability, but it also may 
pay such handsome political benefits that liability will have no deterrent effect.178 We can expect 
deterrence only when the political cost of losing control over litigation-related costs outweighs the 
political benefits of the program, and that calculation is necessarily indeterminate.  Thus, 
government tort liability cannot guarantee that government will spend a given sum in order to 
achieve greater savings in the future. 
There is, however, little reason to believe that the government will overinvest in loss 
prevention.  Tort liability gives elected officials an incentive to make only those investments that will 
likely produce even greater cost savings through reduced liability, but no more.  There is little reason 
to believe that elected officials will reduce their own pool of funds available for politically optimal 
use by overspending on loss prevention; the political benefits of those investments are speculative, 
and most of them will likely be realized at some uncertain point in the future, which may well be 
beyond the next electoral cycle.179 Thus, a regime of government liability is likely to fail to achieve 
the level of efficiency thought possible in the private sector, but it will lead to greater investment in 
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loss prevention than a no-liability regime, without creating credible risk of overdeterrence.  
III. ASSESSING GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 
Parts I and II endeavor to be merely descriptive.  It remains to assess a regime of 
government tort liability.   
We have seen that government tort liability can be expected to encourage elected officials to 
invest in loss prevention with little likelihood of overdeterrence.  That may tempt one to favor 
government liability as a means of reducing welfare losses caused by government conduct.  Indeed, 
the law reviews are full of proposals for damages claims that can be brought against the government 
to reduce the incidence of asserted welfare losses that are either attributable to government or 
avoidable through greater governmental investment in loss prevention.  Recent proposals include 
requiring the government to pay damages to pretrial detainees who are ultimately acquitted,180 those 
whom the police fail to protect from mob violence,181 students who are the victim of pregnancy 
discrimination,182 or obesity harassment,183 the victims of racial profiling,184 and those who are 
wrongfully convicted.185 Scholars have also advocated the abolition of qualified immunity on the 
grounds that it too often leaves constitutional violations unremedied,186 the abolition of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity for the same reason,187 imposing vicarious liability on municipalities for the 
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constitutional torts of their employees,188 and permitting awards of presumed and punitive damages 
against municipalities in order to maximize the deterrent effect of civil liability.189 Each of these 
proposals requires the government to assume costs in order to avoid losses experienced by 
individuals; consequently, they all have a negative impact on government budgets, regardless of the 
externalized benefits they may produce – unless one can make the rather implausible claim that 
these proposals would be so popular that the voters would tolerate an increase in taxes to fund the 
new expenditures that they necessitate.   
Despite the evident disinterest of most legal scholars in this question, government liability 
has important effects on governmental budgeting; and those effects are not likely to be evenly 
distributed among all government expenditures.  As Gerald Frug once observed of court-ordered 
remedial plans seeking to improve the performance of public institutions thought to be performing 
below constitutional standards: 
 Because government resources are limited and because some commitments of those 
resources cannot be reduced due to contract or other obligations, the impact of a court’s 
decisions falls on a relatively few budget items.  The court is in fact allocating the budget 
away from those items, probably without even knowing what they are.  The court’s 
allocation decision is simply that every element of the court decree take precedence over 
every other competing element in the budget, whatever they may be.  The legislature retains 
no say at all about the comparative value of the item lost to the item required by the court.  
Thus the value of legislative decisionmaking on budget allocation is undermined, to a greater 
or lesser degree, depending on the size of the court’s demands and the amount of money 
available. 
 
Some have argued that such judicial intervention in the budget process in favor of 
prisoners and the mentally ill can be justified because those groups are left out of the normal 
political decisionmaking processes.  Indeed they often are.  But the scarce resources 
allocated by government are largely allocated to people indistinguishable from those affected 
by the court orders.  The mentally ill involuntarily committed to an institution may receive 
additional services under court order at the expense of those voluntarily committed to the 
same institution, or those not committed but using outpatient facilities at public hospitals or 
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mental health centers.  Prisoners may receive better medical care at the expense of a parolee 
who seeks it at a public hospital, or they may receive training or addiction services at the 
expense of the public at large who need identical services.  Many beneficiaries of court 
orders are not entitled to vote, but neither are the children whose access to education, 
libraries, or welfare benefits might be curtailed to pay for the court order.  The allocation of 
scarce resources by court order is not likely to be fortunate to the powerless; it is already the 
powerless to whom the state largely directs its resources.190 
Professor Frug’s point has even more force when applied to damages awards against the 
government – damages awards drain the public treasury in an even more direct fashion than 
compliance with injunctive decrees.  What is more, it is far from clear that social welfare is enhanced 
by a regime of government tort liability.  If one assumes that the public’s willingness to pay taxes is 
essentially fixed at any given time, then diverting limited revenues from public uses that may 
produce greater social welfare gains – infrastructure, education, health care, police, and the host of 
other welfare-enhancing services that government provides – to the payment of judgments and 
other litigation expenses harms social welfare.  The existence of political accountability creates a 
substantial incentive to spend public funds in ways that produce relatively broad benefits – an 
incentive that tort plaintiffs and their lawyers lack. 
Finally, government tort liability also has a significant impact on one especially large group 
of essentially innocent third parties -- the taxpayers and the public at large.  We have seen that the 
taxpayers lack meaningful culpability for the tortious conduct of government, yet the financial 
consequences of government liability are borne by them.   Similarly, whenever a judge or jury 
unilaterally directs a commitment of government resources to a particular plaintiff, requiring the 
imposition of additional taxes or a reordering of budgetary priorities, republican values are 
compromised.  Perhaps most important, government is subject to an array of responsibilities 
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unknown in the private sector.  While a private party can reasonably be expected to make all cost-
justified investments in safety, private tortfeasors are generally under no duty to protect the public at 
large from threats not of their own creation.191 Government, however, has a politically enforceable 
obligation to protect the public from all threats to its safety and welfare.  Accordingly, government 
faces infinitely more difficult resources allocation decisions than those confronting the private 
sector.  Accordingly, when a judge or jury exercises control over the allocation of public resources, 
the consequences may be far more dramatic than in the private sector if the ability of the 
government to meet the social, economic, security, and other threats that the public expects it to 
confront is compromised by the burden of litigation costs.     
Thus, government damages liability is problematic. With that preface, the various species of 
government liability merit separate consideration. 
A.  Common Law Torts 
1.  The marginal utility of government liability -- We have seen that government tort liability can be 
expected to produce greater government investment in loss prevention than a no-liability regime. 
There is reason to doubt, however, that the marginal gain in loss prevention will be significant. 
Putting aside the system of tort liability, there is a means for holding the government 
accountable when it fails to make sufficient efforts to prevent losses fairly attributable to its own 
activities – the next election.  When the government fails to invest sufficient resources in the 
maintenance of its streets, for example, there is an issue for the next election regardless of whether 
vehicle owners are able to bring tort actions to recover damages caused by potholes.  Indeed, the 
political potency of this issue may well be greater if the vehicle owners’ losses have gone 
uncompensated.  The existence of such political accountability government calls into question any 
regime of common law tort liability.  What is more, at least at the local level, there is an especially 
stringent form of political accountability at work.  Because businesses and individuals to opt out of 
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the local political process by moving to a different location, and because new businesses and 
residents are always free to select their desired location, local governments are effectively competing 
with each other for desirable residents and businesses that can assist in local development.192 
Considerable empirical evidence confirms that local governments compete to provide residents and 
businesses with a high ratio of services to taxes as a result of these competitive pressures.193 It 
follows that even absent government tort liability, if a local government failed to make adequate 
investments in loss prevention – driving up local insurance rates and increasing the risk of 
uncompensated loss – then residents and businesses will locate elsewhere, undermining the local tax 
base and economy.  This dynamic creates powerful political incentives to invest in loss prevention 
that do not depend on the threat of tort liability.  Indeed, there is some reason to believe that even 
among the states, interjurisdictional competition also operates in this same fashion, albeit to a lesser 
extent.194 
In short, political accountability gives elected officials an incentive to protect the public’s 
safety – their political vulnerability in such circumstances can be at least as important as the threat of 
damages liability.  To make the point concrete, consider once again Dalehite. That case was one of 
some 300 cases arising from the explosion and fire at an ammonium nitrate facility at Texas City, 
Texas, on April 16 and 17, 1947, seeking some $300 million in damages.195 As part of a federal 
program in which facilities that formerly were used to make explosives were converted to the 
production of fertilizer for occupied Japan, nearly 3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer 
were shipped to a warehouse in Texas City and loaded onto two ships.196 One of the ships caught 
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fire, both exploded, and “much of the city was leveled . . . .”197 Justice Jackson added: 
 More than 560 persons perished in this holocaust, and some 3,000 were injured.  The entire 
dock area of a thriving port was leveled and property damage ran into the millions of dollars. 
 
This was a man-made disaster; it was in no sense an ‘act of God.’  The fertilizer had 
been manufactured in Government-owned plants at the Government’s order and to its 
specifications.  It was being shipped at its direction as part of its program of foreign aid.  
The disaster was caused by forces set in motion by the Government, completely controlled 
or controllable by it.  Its causative factors were far beyond the control or knowledge of the 
victims; they were not only incapable of contributing to it, but could not even take shelter or 
flight from it.198 
The majority concluded that the allegations that the government negligently planned and executed 
the shipment of unstable fertilizer were barred by the FTCA’s immunity for discretionary 
judgments.199 In dissent, Justice Jackson argued that the government officials running the program 
should have been foreseen that the fertilizer was unstable and posed an unreasonable threat to the 
public.200 Justice Jackson’s dissent makes a powerful argument that government officials had 
recklessly endangered the public – an argument with enormous political potency, whatever its legal 
merit.  Indeed, we have seen that Congress eventually provided statutory compensation for the 
victims of the Texas City disaster, albeit at a level with less budgetary impact than an award of 
complete consequential damages.201 As the events surrounding Dalehite illustrate, political forces 
come powerfully into play when the government endangers the public’s safety, even when there is 
immunity from liability. 
Consider another example of more recent vintage.  It has been reported that the failures in 
New Orleans’ levee system caused by Hurricane Katrina were the result of easily foreseeable and 
readily repairable faults in levee construction and maintenance.202 That may make out a classic case 
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of negligence,203 but surely no one could think that such a damages action would be necessary to 
hold public officials accountable for their failure to maintain the levee system properly. 204 Any 
instance of government bungling that compromises the public’s safety is likely to have potent 
political consequences. 
2.  The difficulty of adjudicating governmental liability -- Then there is the problematic nature of 
adjudicating government liability in tort.  As Louis Jaffe long ago observed: 
 We can assume the hypothesis of a governmental decision which creates a risk that could be 
considered either unnecessary to achieve the end in view or avoidable by an expenditure 
deemed reasonable.  The difficulties of evaluating such a decision in terms of negligence are 
notorious.  The decision will have rested in part on a technical judgment as to the size of the 
risk and the need to incur it; in part on a political judgment as to who should bear the 
indirect costs.  A judge or a jury is not well equipped either to make such determinations 
initially or to review them.205 
For these reasons, Professor Jaffee defended immunity for discretionary decisions, “if only because, 
as we have noted, a court cannot undertake to determine whether complex governmental decisions 
are ‘reasonable.’”206 Indeed, this is the standard account of discretionary immunity.207 But 
Professor Jaffee understated the problem; it is the rare tort action in which an evaluation of the 
manner in which the government has chosen to allocate scarce public resources is unnecessary.  
Take as prosaic an example as the repair of potholes. 208 State and local governments must decide 
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how much money they will allocate to this function.  When sufficient funds are not allocated to 
locate and repair all potentially dangerous potholes as soon as practicable, then the government 
imposes upon all who use its roads a risk of injury.  Still, this is at its heart a discretionary judgment 
– government must decide how much it can afford to spend on pothole repair in light of its limited 
resources and the many demands on those resources.  The government may be willing to tolerate a 
higher risk of injury from potholes rather than reduce the resources available for police protection, 
which may lead to even more serious losses.  For these reasons, pothole repair can be characterized 
as falling within discretionary immunity.209 Even the method that repair crews use involves a 
discretionary judgment – patches can be repaired more durably with more labor-intensive methods, 
but the more time that is spent on each patch, the fewer potholes that can be repaired.210 
Indeed, the line between immunized discretion and nonimmunized negligence is wholly 
indistinct.  To illustrate the point, consider Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 211 In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that although the Coast Guard’s decision to provide a lighthouse in aid of 
navigation was an immunized act of discretion, once it undertook to provide that service and 
induced reliance on the part of passing ships, it was obligated to keep the lighthouse in good 
repair.212 But programs to inspect and repair lighthouses cost money – the more frequent and 
thorough the inspections, the greater the cost.  The Coast Guard must decide how to undertake 
inspection and repair in light of its limited resources and the many demands placed upon it.  It is 
difficult to understand how a jury could define the Coast Guard’s duty of care with respect to its 
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lighthouses without revisiting a host of policy decisions made by Congress in its appropriation 
decisions, and by Coast Guard officials when deciding how to allocate funds within appropriated 
limits.  Perhaps the Coast Guard abuses its discretion by failing to promptly inspect and maintain 
lighthouses – although even this much is debatable inasmuch as committing resources in this 
fashion could leave even more serious hazards to navigation unaddressed – but its resource 
allocation decisions, even if misguided, are an immunized discretionary function nevertheless.   
Thus, although there are a few governmental decisions that do not involve any meaningful 
consideration of how limited resources are to be allocated,213 any time that a plaintiff contends that a 
governmental defendant failed to undertake sufficient investment in loss prevention, it is entirely fair 
to characterize the lawsuit as seeking to impose liability on a policy judgment.214 
The problem of discretion, in turn, illustrates the anomalous role that courts must assume in 
assessing governmental tort liability.  Most governmental decisions – how much time to spend 
training police officers in the use of excessive force, how whether and how allegations of 
misconduct by public officials should be investigated, whether potholes in public streets should be 
barricaded – involve questions about how scarce public resources should be allocated.   We have 
seen that government faces infinitely more difficult resources allocation decisions than those 
confronting the private sector.  There is little reason, however, to believe that judges or juries are in 
any position to make such judgments which, after all, require consideration of all the demands facing 
a unit of government with a responsibility to protect the safety and welfare of the entire public.  The 
Appropriations Clause and its state counterparts suggest that it is a uniquely legislative function to 
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decide how public funds are to be allocated.215 Yet judges and juries effectively exercise that 
function when they impose tort liability on government. 
To be sure, one can argue that tort law should require the government to raise taxes to the 
point where sufficient funds are spent to provide reasonable protection from all threats, but the 
threat to republican values would be profound if tort law, rather than the people’s elected 
representatives, took control of tax and loss prevention policy.   Moreover, a decision to levy taxes 
at the level sufficient to make all investments in loss-prevention that a jury might find to be cost-
justified would itself raise a host of complex issues about whether increased taxes may adversely 
affect the business climate or otherwise reduce the attractiveness of the jurisdiction to the point 
where the tax base will itself begin to erode, jeopardizing the ability of the jurisdiction to afford 
continued investment in loss protection.  And in light of the political constraints on increasing taxes, 
governmental tort liability could have the perverse result of reducing rather than increasing 
governmental investment in loss prevention.  Resources diverted to litigation costs are unavailable 
for investment in loss prevention, and especially in a poorer jurisdiction with a limited tax base, it 
may be impracticable to increase taxes sufficiently to cover both litigation costs and all other 
measures that a jury might one day conclude constituted cost-justified investment in loss prevention. 
 Moreover, the financial burden of liability fall on taxpayers who, as we have seen, are essentially 
innocent third parties with far less ability to “exit” a taxing jurisdiction than a shareholder 
dissatisfied with corporate risk management has to sell his stock. 
These problems have a racial dimension as well.  As Richard Thompson Ford has explained, 
even in a race-neutral legal regime, racial and ethnic groups that have been faced discrimination in 
the past are disproportionately likely to be poor and therefore to reside in older, less desirable 
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communities where housing is relatively inexpensive. 216 These communities, in turn will more likely 
experience crumbling infrastructure and a host of other problems that give rise to tort liability, yet 
their tax base will make it all the more difficult to finance necessary improvements. Moreover, when 
tax revenues must be used to pay judgments and other legal expenses that will fall disproportionately 
on such communities, businesses and high-income taxpayers will experience a declining ratio 
government services received to taxes paid, and will have a greater incentive to locate elsewhere.  
The remaining tax base is less able to afford to pay tort judgments, and to fund the necessary cost-
avoidance measures.   
Thus, tort liability is a kind of regressive tax likely to impose greater burdens on poorer 
communities with lesser ability to fund either the liabilities or the necessary loss-prevention 
measures.  It is accordingly one of a number of factors that can stimulate urban decline, and 
exacerbate problems of racial unfairness as well.  
3.  The weak case for governmental liability -- There is accordingly a strong argument to be made 
that governmental loss-prevention policies are best left to the ordinary process of political 
accountability, by which other government policies are assessed, rather than effectively controlled 
through the vehicle of tort litigation.  Nevertheless, arguments for government tort liability remain. 
Political accountability is at best an imperfect means for encouraging government to 
undertake adequate investment in loss prevention.   The advocates of public choice theory teach that 
political accountability operates imperfectly because it is generally costly and difficult for the voters 
to monitor government policy. 217 Surely this observation has merit – it is not very often that 
government loss-prevention policy dominates a political campaign.  We have also seen that a 
measure of accountability is also achieved by the ability of dissatisfied taxpayers and businesses to 
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relocate, but the costs of exit are substantial, leaving taxpayers who must bear the burden of 
government liability with a far from optimal ability to affect government policy.218 Thus, in a 
regime of no liability, the remaining restraints on government loss prevention policy are likely to 
produce less than optimal results.  There is likely to be some marginal benefit from a regime of 
government liability by enhancing government incentives to invest in loss prevention, although it is 
admittedly difficult to estimate its magnitude.  
Accordingly, the case for government liability is likely to turn on the marginal benefits in 
terms of promoting efficient government investment in loss prevention offered by a regime of 
government liability.  We have seen, moreover, that many government tort immunities operate in 
areas in which political accountability is likely to be strongest – discretionary decisions, law 
enforcement, and the safety of public infrastructure, for example.  In areas where elected officials 
are most likely to be held politically accountable for failing to protect the public, the marginal utility 
of government tort liability is therefore likely to be small.   And from the standpoint of corrective 
justice, where it is reasonable to expect the public to exact its own form of punishment at the next 
election, it is surely problematic to effectively shift liability onto essentially innocent taxpayers, or to 
divert resources from those who may need them far more than the plaintiff, and who are essentially 
blameless for the plaintiff’s loss, and allocate them to a plaintiff who, in most cases, could have 
purchased insurance rather than run a risk of uncompensated loss.219 Accordingly, given the impact 
of tort liability on republican values as well as the price paid by essentially innocent third parties who 
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face higher taxes, reduced government services, or some combination of each as a consequence of 
tort liability, statutory tort immunity in areas where political accountability is likely to operate 
effectively is well justified.  For similar reasons, caps on recoverable tort damages and the 
prohibition on punitive damages are equally justifiable.  The caps keep some pressure on elected 
officials to invest in safety, but mitigate the hardship on the public at large when scarce 
governmental resources are diverted to the payment of judgments.  While the caps mean that some 
losses will go uncompensated, without them other critical needs of the public may go unaddressed 
as well.  As Part II.C above explains, government tort liability cannot be expected to produce an 
efficient result; its virtue lies in its ability to produce some degree of political pressure on 
government to invest in loss prevention.  Reasonable limitations on government damages liability 
accomplishes just that result, while mitigating the anomalies that government liability can produce. 
Discretionary immunity, as well as statutory protections on a public employer’s vicarious 
liability for the torts of its employees, is also justifiable in light of the problems that inhere in 
vicarious employer liability in the public sector.  We hold private firms liable for the torts of their 
employees to ensure that they make all cost-justified investments in loss prevention, but Part II.C 
explains that this approach will not work in the public sector.  Thus, the rule that requires private-
sector employers to essentially act as insurers of the tort liability of their employees has no proper 
application to the public sector.  As long as the government adequately trains and supervises its 
employees – a function for which it is likely to be held politically accountable – the justification for 
requiring the taxpayers to shoulder the costs of vicarious liability is vanishingly thin. 
B.  Constitutional Torts 
1.  The irrelevance of political accountability -- We have seen that the process of political 
accountability weakens the case for government liability in common law tort.  The same is not true 
for constitutional torts.  In that context, the case for substituting political accountability for a regime 
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of tort liability disappears.  
Inhering in the concept of a constitutional right is that its protection does not depend on the 
political acceptance of the right at stake.  Thus, political accountability is an unacceptable method 
for securing constitutional rights; the Constitution protects even the unpopular or politically 
inexpedient. 220 Accordingly, discretionary and other categorical immunities are inappropriate for 
constitutional torts; a law of constitutional torts must place pressure on the government to conform 
of all its conduct to the Constitution.  That does not imply, however, that damages are always 
properly award for a constitutional violation.  Once one understands that the primary virtue of 
damages awards against the government is to create a political incentive to undertake loss 
prevention, there is ample room for damages-limiting doctrines that protect the interests of the 
taxpayers and avoid unwarranted reallocation of scarce public resources. 
2.  Qualified immunity and vicarious employer liability -- Part I.B above explains that given the 
reality of indemnification, the stated justification for qualified immunity – avoiding overdeterrence 
of individual public officials – is unpersuasive.  That conclusion does not mean, however, that 
qualified immunity serves no legitimate function.   When qualified immunity is viewed from the 
standpoint of a public employer – the party that bears the economic burden of liability – this 
doctrine has a compelling justification.  Indeed, viewing qualified immunity from the standpoint of 
the public employer lends considerable coherence to this doctrine. 
 Qualified immunity shields officials from liability unless they violate clearly established 
law.221 Accordingly, qualified immunity limits the resources that the government must devote to 
training and supervision of public officials.  Public employers need only undertake to secure 
compliance with established legal rules; they need not endeavor to train and supervise employees to 
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make more difficult legal judgments.  Given the expense and uncertain efficacy of training and 
supervision directed at unsettled questions of constitutional law, it is doubtful that the diversion of 
scarce public resources from other public purposes to such training and supervision – or to the 
payment of judgments and other legal costs – is justifiable. 
Consider Wilson v. Layne,222 in which the Court, after holding that the Fourth Amendment 
forbids law enforcement officers from permitting reporters to accompany them as they execute a 
search warrant for a residence,223 nevertheless granted the officers qualified immunity, noting that 
Fourth Amendment law on this point was undeveloped when the search at issue occurred and the 
then-extant policies of the two law enforcement agencies involved in the case appeared to permit 
reporters to accompany officers executing a warrant.224 Surely there is no point in holding officers 
liable for adhering to office policy.  In the absence of any claim against the employees’ supervisors 
alleging that they had caused the violation by providing unreasonable training and supervision, 
liability cannot be expected to reduce the incidence of constitutional violations.  Wilson illustrates 
how qualified immunity operates to evaluate the manner in which public officials have been 
supervised. 
Or consider the decision in Brosseau v. Haugen.225 In that case, a police officer shot Haugen, 
who was wanted on an outstanding felony warrant, after he had eluded police seeking to execute the 
warrant, made his way to his jeep, and then began to drive off despite the officer’s repeated orders 
to stop.226 The Court granted the officer qualified immunity on the ground that no clear rule had 
emerged about whether the Constitution permits an officer “to shoot a fleeing felon, set on avoiding 
capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.”227 
222 526 U.S. 603 (1999).  
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Justice Stevens, in dissent, nevertheless made a compelling case that the officer’s conduct was 
unreasonable – Haugen had not committed a violent crime or threatened the officer, and there was 
no evidence that he intended to drive off recklessly or otherwise endanger bystanders.228 Justice 
Stevens acknowledged, however, that there was some risk that Brosseau might have injured 
someone as he drove off, and therefore that there was “uncertainty about how an officer making a 
split-second decision to use deadly force would have assessed the foreseeability of a serious accident 
. . . .”229 But in this context, it is doubtful that any greater investment in training and supervision of 
officers could have prevented a constitutional violation.  The applicable constitutional rule is that a 
fleeing felon can be shot only when there is “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
serious threat of physical harm, either to the officer or others . . . .”230 It is surely reasonable to 
expect public employers to train law enforcement officers to know this rule, but it is unclear that 
additional training and supervision will ever enhance the likelihood that the officer will act correctly 
when making a split-second decision about whether a fleeing felon is likely to endanger someone 
else.  A significant error rate is inherent in split-second police judgments, and when a law 
enforcement agency has likely invested all resources that are reasonably warranted in training and 
supervision with respect to constitutional requirements, the case for awarding damages is vanishingly 
thin – the damages award will not likely reduce the rate of constitutional violations, but it would 
divert public resources that could be invested far more efficaciously in other types of public goods, 
including loss prevention.231 
Qualified immunity therefore properly shields public officials from liability in cases in which 
the public employer has made reasonable investments in securing compliance with the Constitution. 
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Qualified immunity places the burden on the employer/indemnitor to monitor its employees with 
respect to clearly established law, the context in which monitoring is most likely to be cost-effective. 
 While phrased as a protection for public employees, as it operates, qualified immunity judges the 
reasonableness of the employer’s conduct by giving it an incentive to reduce constitutional injuries 
where the law is settled and the costs of monitoring are therefore reasonable. Municipal liability is 
also appropriate when based on a culpable municipal policy; once again, liability is properly 
premised on the government’s own failure to take sufficient measures to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution.232 There is, however, little justification for insisting on a greater allocation of public 
resources to loss prevention when the ability to reduce constitutional violations with respect to 
unsettled law or unclear legal obligations is itself open to great doubt.233 In the face of unsettled 
legal obligations, the most likely effect of imposing liability is to require a public employer to provide 
what amounts to constitutional tort insurance.  We have seen, however, that a regime of vicarious 
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 I am unaware of any empirical evidence that the doctrine of qualified immunity has operated to inhibit the development 
of constitutional law. 
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employer liability has little justification in the public sector, where tort law cannot hope to produce 
the efficient level of investment in loss prevention that is the objective of respondeat superior.234 
Thus, constitutional tort liability produces political pressure on government to conform its conduct 
to the Constitution; while qualified immunity and limited employer liability bar awards of damages in 
contexts where liability is unlikely to reduce the incidence of constitutional violations.  
3.  Measure of damages -- These same considerations support the refusal to base constitutional 
tort damages on the presumed or inherent value of constitutional rights. 235 Aside from the difficulty 
of identifying a nonarbitrary basis to measure the abstract value of a constitutional right, imposing 
this type of liability would be unacceptably likely to overdeter – presumed damages awards 
inevitably place pressure on the government to engage in even non-cost-justified loss prevention 
measures.  Far better to achieve deterrence through a regime of punitive damages collectable from 
individual wrongdoers, rather than through awarding a form of presumed damages that is ultimately 
paid by the taxpaying public.  Indeed, it was my experience in municipal government that nothing 
terrified my clients more than the possibility of an award of punitive damages, for which they could 
not be indemnified.  When I wanted to impress upon an official, even at the highest levels of 
municipal government, with the magnitude of legal risk inhering in a particular course of action, 
nothing worked better than a discourse on punitive damages.  Given the costs that government 
liability impose on essentially innocent third parties, punitive damages paid by the actual wrongdoer 
are far preferable to a regime of presumed compensatory damages that would inevitably be punitive 
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is in effect.236 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made just this point as it rejected the availability of 
punitive damages against municipalities under section 1983.237 Moreover, punitive damages 
represent the ideal solution for officials who are willing to countenance or even encourage 
constitutional violations because of the political benefits they yield.  Punitive damages are thought 
warranted in the private sector when compensatory awards are likely to give defendants insufficient 
incentives to avoid tortious behavior;238 in the public sector, punitive damages are warranted when 
compensatory awards may provide officials with insufficient political incentive to comply with the 
Constitution.  Punitive damages are appropriate when compensatory damages will underdeter, and 
cases in which compensatory damages do not adequate address a political incentive to violate the 
Constitution are therefore proper for the imposition of punitive damages. 239 
4.  Statutory limitations on damages – The Bivens line of cases suggests that damages liability for 
constitutional torts is constitutionally compelled, at least absent a satisfactory alternative remedy or 
the presence of special factors, since a constitutional right without a correlative remedy is no right at 
all.240 The Court has provided little guidance, however, as to what constitutes an adequate 
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alternative remedy.241 On the view advanced here that the purpose of a constitutional tort action is 
to use the budgetary impact of liability to impose a political cost for constitutional violations, an 
adequate remedy should ordinarily involve a financial consequence for a constitutional violation to 
ensure that it imposes a political price.  Yet on this view, the decision in Schweiker v. Chilicky,242 at 
first blush, seems problematic.  In that case, the Court rejected a Bivens claim for consequential 
damages caused by wrongful denial of disability benefits on the ground that Congress had 
authorized no more than an award of retroactive benefits in the disability benefits provisions of the 
Social Security Act.243 The result is that there was no budgetary impact associated with a 
constitutional violation; a result seemingly at odds with the view advanced here.  But I have 
endeavored to demonstrate that public-sector liability rules should be sensitive to the impact of 
liability on third parties and the provision of government services, and these considerations offer a 
defense for Chilicky.
The constitutional violation alleged in Chilicky was that administrators had deprived the 
plaintiffs of property without due process of law by manipulating the disability review process to 
wrongfully terminate benefits in order to reduce the cost of the program.244 The statutory remedy 
of retroactive benefits, however, prevented administrators from achieving the budgetary reductions 
they sought, and for that reason deprived them of the political benefit they sought in reducing 
expenditures on an evidently disfavored constituency.  A statutory remedy that deprives 
administrators of the political benefits they seek from violating the law may well be sufficient to 
sustain the adequacy of that remedy – especially when coupled with the availability of punitive 
 
241 See generally, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995); 
George P. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs: Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 
(1989); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch 
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1747-49 (2001); Betsey J. Grey, Preemption of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must 
Congress Speak?, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 1087 (1992); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilacky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA.
L. REV. 1117 (1989); Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional Cause of Action, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1251 (1988). 
242 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
243 See id. at 424-29.  
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damages against individual officials responsible for undermining the integrity of the program.  Aside 
from that, the misconduct alleged involved undermining a congressional intent to provide the 
benefits at issue; the violation was therefore subject to what was likely to be effective political 
scrutiny.  Indeed, by the time that the case reached the Court, Congress had already overhauled the 
program to eliminate perceived abuses.245 Moreover, the Court was undoubtedly right to concern 
itself with the potential for budgetary disruption caused by the threat of unlimited liability.246 If 
unlimited damages were available for a wrongful denial of disability benefits, the federal disability 
program could become so expensive that political support for would ebb.  This would hardly be a 
blow for the disabled or others dependent on government aid.   
For similar reasons, statutory damages caps similar to those that many states have enacted 
for common law torts are defensible.  We have seen that reasonable damages caps preserve political 
pressure on government to conform its conduct to the law, but mitigate the anomalies associated 
with government damages liability.  An example is provided by Bush v. Lucas,247 in which the Court 
rejected a Bivens action in light of the availability of statutory civil service remedies that granted the 
successful plaintiffs retroactive seniority and backpay.248 Since backpay and retroactive seniority 
means that the government in effect must pay an employee for not working, there is a significant 
political cost to this remedy that should sustain its adequacy.  At a minimum, an inquiry into the 
political efficacy of a statutory remedy will usefully guide an assessment of its adequacy.   
Thus, a focus on the political costs associated with statutory limitations on constitutional tort 
damages provides a useful vehicle for evaluating their adequacy in light of Bivens’ objective of 
ensuring that constitutional rights have correlative remedies.  A regime of limited liability that 
nevertheless imposes a sufficient political price to minimize the likelihood of constitutional 
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violations should be sustained. 
C.  Takings 
1.  The role of compensation in limiting overuse of eminent domain -- We have seen that the 
constitutional requirement of compensation cannot be expected to produce only cost-justified 
takings of private property because the political costs of paying the requisite compensation cannot 
readily be monetized.  Still, the constitutional requirement of compensation imposes considerable 
political restraint on the power of eminent domain.   Consideration of the political operation of a 
regime in which takings did not require compensation makes the point. 
Absent a constitutional requirement of compensation, property owners could protect their 
investments by securing takings insurance, and the rising cost of takings insurance that would result 
from overuse of condemnation could create a political restraint on elected officials. 249 But it is 
unclear how effectively insurance rates would check governmental overuse of condemnation; after 
all, the cost of insurance is hardly the only issue on which politicians are judged.  The requirement of 
compensation, in contrast, imposes political discipline on the use of eminent domain.  The 
government must budget for compensation, and incur the political opportunity costs associated with 
the payment of compensation.250 Indeed, the compensation requirement imposes a far more direct 
political restraint than does ordinary tort liability.  The incentive to invest in loss prevention created 
by common law or constitutional tort liability is muted by the fact that it is difficult to predict future 
 
248 See id. at 388-89. 
249 The availability of insurance and the political impact of high insurance rates caused by promiscuous use of 
eminent domain has caused some to argue that the compensation requirement is unjustified.  See Steven P. Calandrillo, 
Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST.
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250 Although they have not linked the observation to a theory of political behavior like the one advanced 
above, commentators have observed that the budgetary impact of compensation will restrain the use of eminent domain. 
 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 185, at 73-75; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 77-81 
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liabilities, and even more difficult to predict the extent to which they will be reduced by investment 
in loss-prevention measures.251 The compensation requirement affects governmental budgets in a 
far more immediate and predictable fashion – compensation is required for every taking, it must 
generally be paid at the time of the taking, its cost is readily determinable through appraisal.252 Thus 
the political impact of compensation is unusually direct, immediate, and predictable.  
2.  The public use inquiry -- The preceding discussion suggests that the Supreme Court correctly 
defers to the judgment of elected officials when deciding whether a taking is for a “public use” 
within the meaning of the Takings Clause – even when property is condemned for the purpose of 
transferring it to a private party for purposes of economic development as in Kelo v. City of New 
London.253 Although it is possible that a legislature would decide to condemn property in a naked 
effort to transfer wealth to either the property owner or a third party to which it plans to convey the 
property unaccompanied by any broader public benefit, 254 given the political opportunity costs of 
condemnation, it is unlikely that elected officials would choose to deploy scarce governmental 
resources in such a politically disadvantageous fashion.   In such circumstances, the likelihood of 
retribution in the next election should be, at least for most elected officials, unacceptably high. 
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To be sure, one could read the Takings Clause as requiring that the public physically use 
condemned property, but this would prohibit takings in order to build prisons, military bases, or 
other facilities not open to the public.  Even the most vigorous advocates of restricting eminent 
domain resist this view and acknowledge that the public can “use” a facility within the meaning of 
the Takings Clause even when it is not open to the public.255 Once this type of indirect and 
metaphorical public use is accepted as consistent with the constitutional text, it becomes difficult to 
draw lines – in some sense the public “uses” the benefits of a redevelopment that lowers crime and 
generates new tax revenues just as it “uses” prisons and the military.256 The public makes the same 
metaphorical “use” of toll roads or utilities that acquire property by condemnation whether they are 
publicly or privately owned.257 For this reason, the opponents of condemnation for the benefit of a 
private party are forced to advocate all sorts of complicated tests to decide whether a particular 
condemnation for the purpose of eventually transfer to a private party is for a public use in the 
constitutional sense.258 Litigation governed by such standards would necessarily be complex, 
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expensive, and prone to error.  It would also be directed toward a policy question – the extent to 
which a given condemnation will ultimately yield sufficient public benefits – where judicial 
competence is at its nadir.  Elected officials  -- enmeshed as they are in the Darwinian world of 
electoral accountability – are far more likely to be able to assess the public’s interests than can 
judges.  A far more reliable method than judicial review is to use the political price exacted by the 
compensation requirement to ensure that public resources are devoted only to public uses in the 
rather metaphorical sense of the Takings Clause. 
3.  The standard for just compensation – The political restraint imposed by the compensation 
requirement suggests that the measure of “just compensation” when property is condemned for the 
purposes of transfer to a private party should differ from the compensation owed for property that 
the government acquires for its own use.259 The condemning authority, when it assembles a large 
parcel for conveyance to a developer, may receive a price in excess of its costs of acquiring 
individual parcels; a large parcel invites a variety of intensive commercial or industrial uses that may 
possess far greater value than the price paid for the individual parcels from which it was 
assembled.260 Indeed, the need to assemble large parcels coupled with the holdout problems caused 
by the owners of individual parcels is one of the primary justifications for eminent domain.261 In 
such cases, by offsetting its acquisition costs as it resells the property, the condemning authority 
mitigates the budgetary impact of condemnation; it could even turn a profit.  In this fashion, the 
political check on overuse of eminent domain created by the compensation requirement is 
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undermined.  But when one understands the just compensation requirement in terms of the political 
cost that the Takings Clause requires to be exacted in connection with condemnation, it follows that 
the requisite “just compensation” should include some proportioned measure of the premium that 
the government has or may obtain through a redevelopment project.  In that fashion, the political 
restraint imposed by the compensation requirement is properly preserved.  And if, as I have argued, 
the compensation requirement is properly understood as a political restraint on takings, then it is 
essential that this political restraint not be diluted by turning eminent domain into what could 
amount to a revenue center for government. 
CONCLUSION 
Government responds to political and not market signals.  It should therefore come as no 
surprise that economic theory offers limited insight into governmental tort liability.  And because 
government externalizes its costs, corrective justice also offers little insight into government tort 
liability.  Government operates in a political context, and accordingly government tort liability must 
be understood in political terms.  The Supreme Court endeavored to offer such a theory in 
Richardson v. McKnight, but its account was seriously deficient. 
My ambition is also to argue the case for and against government tort liability with equal 
vigor.  Tort liability imposes a serious cost on elected officials intent on deploying public resources 
to maximum political advantage.  The fashionable academic skepticism about the efficacy of 
governmental tort liability is therefore quite misguided.  But government tort liability also imposes a 
cost on innocent parties – not only the taxpayers, but also the most vulnerable among us who are 
generally in greatest need of governmental assistance, and most likely to lose out when public 
resources are diverted to the defense of litigation and the payment of judgments.  An attractive 
account of government tort liability must pay close heed both of these costs.  Tort liability properly 
restrains governmental misconduct; but too much of a good thing usually becomes a bad thing, and 
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tort liability is no exception.  In an attractive and just regime of government tort liability, well 
tailored immunity rules are no less essential than a measure of liability itself.
 
